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ABSTRACT
How long should it take a government agency to act on a nondiscretion-
ary duty? When does the agency's decisionmaking process become unreason-
ably delayed, warranting judicial intervention to compel agency action? These
questions are central to the operation and accountability of the modern ad-
ministrative state. Agency delays in decisionmaking and action have been
widely acknowledged as a fundamental impediment to the effective function-
ing of federal agencies for over thirty years, and more recently, significant
delays in regulatory action have raised serious concerns about the political
legitimacy of unfettered presidential control of the bureaucracy. Yet the ap-
propriate role for courts to play in reviewing agency delays has garnered little
attention in the academic literature, and the judicial doctrine is ad hoc, inco-
herent, and difficult to apply consistently. Thus, this Article argues, judicial
review of agency delay is ripe for reform.
Drawing upon the insights of positive political theory, this Article
reframes agency delays as a principal-agent problem between congressional
enacting coalitions and the agency, rather than merely a conflict between the
agency and its beneficiaries, as the problem has traditionally been understood.
Therefore, courts should assess whether agencies have abused their discretion
over when to act in light of the type of decision delegated to the agency,
whether the motivation behind the agency's timeline comports with its dele-
gated authority, and the costs and benefits of inaction to the enacting coali-
tion's statutory goals. This Article proposes that plaintiffs should have the
burden of proving that the costs of delay due to other priorities outweigh the
benefits, but that the burden of proof should shift to the agency once substan-
tive decisionmaking is underway. This burden-shifting framework preserves
agencies' discretion over their agendas while preventing foot-dragging caused
by agency dysfunction, agency capture, or regulatory obstructionism by com-
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peting political principals. In addition, this Article proposes ways in which
agencies' regulatory submissions to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs can facilitate political oversight and provide additional tools for curing
unreasonable delays.
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INTRODUCTION
Complaints about inaction and delay by government officers are
almost as old as the Republic itself,' but such complaints burgeoned
with the dramatic expansion of the administrative state in the twenti-
eth century. 2 In the wake of the Great Society programs and broad
I See, e.g., Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1817) (noting that a surveyor of
customs for the Port of Newport, Rhode Island, could be judicially compelled to hold a forfeiture
hearing after seizing property); ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474, 485
(1912) (affirming a writ of mandamus compelling the Interstate Commerce Commission to take
jurisdiction over a petition to require competitors to file rate schedules); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590 (1926) (affirming an injunction against enforcement of an old rate sched-
ule by a state agency that had delayed adjudicating a new schedule for several years); Safeway
Stores v. Brown, 138 F.2d 278, 278-280 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943) (affirming the dismissal of a
complaint regarding delays by the Price Administrator in adjudicating a protest of maximum
price regulations).
2 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY 105-07 (2d. ed. 1999) (describing severe delays in rulemaking by administra-
tive agencies); Neil R. Eisner, Agency Delay in Informal Rulemaking, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 7, 7 (1989)
("In recent years all three branches of government have been concerned with delay in the
rulemaking process."); Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An
Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 115 (1992) ("While there are
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health, safety, and environmental protection legislation, an expanding
class of government beneficiaries and their advocates complained
about the pace of agency decisionmaking. By 1977, the Senate Com-
mittee on Government Affairs described agency delays as "stagger-
ing" and a "fundamental impediment to the functioning of regulatory
agencies. "3
The best-known recent instance of agency foot-dragging is proba-
bly the resistance of the Bush Administration Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") to regulating greenhouse gas ("GhG")
emissions. The agency took four years to deny a petition for rulemak-
ing by environmental groups, green-energy companies, and trade as-
sociations seeking the regulation of GhG emissions from new motor
vehicles under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),4 claiming both that the
EPA lacked jurisdiction and that, even if it had jurisdiction, the time
was not appropriate to set GhG emission standards for motor vehi-
cles. 5 Even after the Supreme Court ordered the EPA to reexamine
the matter,6 the agency continued to dawdle, ultimately leaving the
decision for the Obama Administration. 7
The case of GhGs is relatively well known, but it is hardly unique.
Agency delays affect a wide range of areas, including our health and
safety," environmental regulation, 9 the administration of public bene-
no firm criteria for how long it should take to write regulations, there is widespread consensus
that it generally takes too long.").
3 Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 2, at 115; see also Richard P. Barke, Regulatory Delay as
Political Strategy, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 144, 145, 148-54 (Howard Ball ed.,
1984) (arguing that regulatory delays sometimes represent a "deliberate device for affecting reg-
ulatory decisions" and providing examples of such delays).
4 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515 (2006).
5 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,922-33 (Sept. 8, 2003); see also Press Release, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, EPA Denies Petition
to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/fb36d84bf0al390c8525701c005e4918/694c8f3b7cl6ff6085256
d900065fdad.
6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007).
7 See Darren Samuelsohn, Will Much-Maligned EPA Reg Blueprint Emerge as "Climate
Change Bible"?, GREENWIRE (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2008/08/
07/1. With climate change at the top of President Obama's agenda, on December 7, 2009, the
EPA reversed itself, concluding that GhGs pose a danger to human health and the environment.
John M. Broder, Greenhouse Gases Imperil Health, E.P.A. Announces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009,
at A18. Thus, after more than eleven years, the EPA finally took the first step in regulating GhG
emissions.
8 The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), for example, still has not set efficacy
standards for hundreds of drugs currently on the market that were approved for safety but not
efficacy under the pre-1962 Food and Drug Act. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3, at 847 (4th ed. 2002); see also Solvay v. ETHEX Corp., No. 03-
2836(JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 2255375, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2006) (noting that although the
1384 [Vol. 79:1381
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fits,' 0 economic regulation," and even our national security policy.12
And although the pace of regulatory activity picked up significantly at
the beginning of the Obama Administration,13 as it often does with an
incoming Democratic administration,'14 agency delays are unlikely to
vanish anytime soon. Even Presidents committed to an active admin-
istrative state have difficulty supervising all of its many responsibili-
ties. There were significant agency delays during the Clinton
Administration, 5 and there have already been complaints about de-
FDA had declared that pancreatic enzyme supplements would require FDA approval, it had not
set new standards for the supplements but had instead adopted the existing standards of the
private United States Pharmacopia Convention). Between 2001 and 2007, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued eighty-six-percent fewer economically sig-
nificant rules and regulations than during the Clinton Administration. R. Jeffrey Smith, Under
Bush, OSHA Mired in Inaction, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at Al. Officials at OSHA reported
that political appointees ordered the withdrawal of work-place health regulations and "slow-
rolled" others in response to industry pressure. Id.
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (ordering the EPA to respond to a petition
for rulemaking on GhGs). Under President Bush, the EPA did not add a single industrial chemi-
cal to the list of water contaminants regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (2006), despite hundreds of potential candidates; nor did the EPA update
many existing regulatory standards to account for new evidence that the chemicals posed greater
risks than previously believed. Charles Duhigg, That Tap Water Is Legal but May Be Unhealthy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at Al.
10 The average processing time for citizenship applications by the United States Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), for example, rose from approximately six months in
2003 to fifteen months in 2008, 2008 CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP.
2, available at https://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2008,0703-ombudsman.pdf, with some
applicants waiting as long as six years for the adjudication of their applications, e.g., First
Amended Complaint at 1, Rangoonwala v. Swacina, No. 08-21588-CIV, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99053 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008). In 2007-2008, I represented two classes of lawful permanent
residents who had waited more than six months for adjudication of their naturalization applica-
tions by USCIS. See Milanes v. Chertoff, No. 08 Civ. 2354(LMM), 2008 WL 4219078, at *1, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated in part, No. 08-4749-cv, 2009 WL 4281969 (2d. Cir. Dec. 2,
2009); Yakubova v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 3203(ERK)(RLM), 2006 WL 6589892, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 2006).
11 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for example, took nearly twenty years to
implement some provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
(2006). KERWIN, supra note 2, at 106-07.
12 Some detainees at GuantAnamo Bay have been waiting more than eight years for a
decision governing their fate. See, e.g., Guantdnamo Detainee Release Blocked by Appeals
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A18 (reporting that Saeed Hatim has been detained at
Guantinamo since June 2002).
13 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, With Obama, Regulations Are Back in Fashion, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2010, at A15.
14 See infra Part II.B.2.
15 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 146-47, 157 (3d Cir.
2002) (ordering mediation to address an OSHA delay in regulating hexavalent chromium due in
part to the Clinton Administration's other priorities); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir.
1996) (noting that President Clinton, upon taking office, ordered agencies to withdraw regula-
2011] 1385
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lays under President Obama.16 Although President Obama has sought
to influence agency decisionmaking in several ways,1 7 his Administra-
tion has not given any attention to agency inaction or delay.18 Moreo-
tions not yet published in the Federal Register); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the withdrawal of regulations
scheduled for final publication when the Clinton Administration took office); Cobell v. Norton,
283 F. Supp. 2d 66, 232 (D.D.C. 2003) (describing the Department of the Interior's "continued
refusal to comply with the clear directives of Congress and the courts to perform an adequate
accounting" of an Indian trust fund during the Clinton Administration); Independence Mining
Co. v. Babbitt, 885 F. Supp. 1356, 1369 (D. Nev. 1995) (upholding a Clinton Administration
order that contributed to a delay in the issuance of mineral patents); Barrick Goldstrike Mines
Inc. v. Babbit, No. CV-N-93-550-HDM(PHA), 1995 WL 408667, at *2, *7-8 (D. Nev. Mar. 21,
1994) (describing the byzantine review process instituted by the Secretary of the Interior to slow
down the issuance of mineral patents while the Clinton Administration sought to change the
mining law).
16 In June 2009, for example, disabled veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars reported
delays of nearly eighteen months in the adjudication of their disability benefit claims. James
Dao, Veterans Affairs, Already Struggling With Backlog, Faces Surge of Disability Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2009, at A10. One veteran's group reported that veterans were calling suicide
hotlines as a result of the delays. Id. The Obama Administration has already failed to meet its
most highly publicized deadline-the closing of Guantinamo Bay by January 22, 2010. See
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Janie Lorber, Missed Guantdnamo
Deadline Stirs Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/
missed-gitmo-deadline-stirs-protest. In March 2011, after missing the deadline by more than a
year, President Obama appeared to put his plan to close the base on hold due to congressional
opposition. Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, In Reversal, Clears Way for Guantdnamo
Trials to Resume, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A19. Scientists have also complained about the
slow response of the Obama Administration to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. Justin Gillis, Scientists Fault Lack of Studies over Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2010, at Al.
17 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113, 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009) (abandoning the
Bush Administration's requirement that agencies identify specific market failures when consid-
ering new regulations); Presidential Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 00384 (May 20, 2009) (initiating a review of state law preemption statements included in
regulatory preambles over the past decade and restricting their use going forward).
18 Soon after taking office, President Obama solicited recommendations on improving the
White House's regulatory review process and instructed the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget ("OMB") to produce a set of recommendations for a new Executive order
within 100 days. Presidential Memorandum on Regulatory Review, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 00287 (Jan. 30, 2009). Nearly 200 comments were submitted to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") by scholars, interest groups, and commentators. See Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a New Executive
Order on Regulatory Review, REGINFO.Gov, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsplEO/fedRegRe-
view/publicComments.jsp (last visited May 4, 2011). Some scholars urged the Administration to
consider the problem of agency inaction and delay in reforming OIRA. See, e.g., Letter from
Jacob Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell to Jessica Hertz, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (posted
Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/AnneJoseph-
OConnell.pdf; Memorandum from Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Inst. for Pub.
Integrity, to the Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.
reginfo.gov/public/jsplEO/fedRegReviewlRevesz Livermore.pdf. On January 18, 2011, after
much delay, President Obama finally issued his new Executive Order on "Improving Regulation
[Vol. 79:13811386
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ver, the healthcare and financial reform legislation passed during
Obama's first term delegated a plethora of new policymaking respon-
sibilities to the administrative state.19 Where Congress has not made
its intent clear, the agencies will inevitably have to decide which legis-
lative mandates to implement first and which to defer until a later
date.
Although few would dispute that agency delays have long been a
significant problem for the administrative state, they have garnered
remarkably little attention in the academic literature. Administrative
law scholars generally frame agency delays, when they discuss them at
all, as a subset of agency inaction.2 0 But the literature on judicial re-
view of agency inaction has focused on whether the doctrines of
nonreviewability or standing shield certain agency decisions not to
act.21 The literature has not addressed how courts should evaluate the
reasonableness of an agency's timeline for decisionmaking if the
agency has a nondiscretionary duty to act. Because an agency can de-
fend its inaction by claiming either that it has no duty to act 22 or that,
even if it does have a duty, it should control the pace and timing of its
action,2 3 the question of reasonableness of agency delay is as impor-
tant to the efficient operation, political accountability, and public
transparency of the administrative state as the nonreviewability and
and Regulatory Review," but it did not address agency inaction or delay. See Exec. Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
19 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1326 (2010); Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
20 See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, Resource Allocation] (arguing that "there is no
articulated principled basis" for treating agency action and inaction differently, but not discuss-
ing agency delay as a separate issue); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of
Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 467 (2008) [hereinafter Bi-
her, Two Sides of the Same Coin] (addressing "unreasonable delay" as a subset of agency inac-
tion and arguing that it should be treated in the same way as agency action); Cass R. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 672 (1985) ("Inac-
tion may be the result of delay in agency decisionmaking rather than evidence of a decision not
to act."). But see 4 CHARLES H. KoCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:52, at 183
(3d ed. 2010) (distinguishing delay from a choice of inaction because "[d]elay is not the exercise
of discretion or any other type of decisionmaking but rather is the result of agency failures");
Eisner, supra note 2, at 13 ("There exists a fine distinction between 'inaction' and 'delay."').
21 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 20, at 13-16; Biber, Two Sides of the Same
Coin, supra note 20, at 466-67; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 683.
22 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 824 (1985).
23 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
2011] 1387
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standing issues that are more frequently discussed. Indeed, it is often
easier for an agency to shirk a congressional mandate by slow rolling
its implementation than by claiming it has no duty to act. 24
In the absence of express statutory timelines, and sometimes even
with them, courts struggle to assess the timing and pace of agency
decisionmaking. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")25 in-
structs agencies to complete matters presented to them in a "reasona-
ble time" 2 6  and authorizes courts to compel agency action
"unreasonably delayed," 27 but the Supreme Court has never in-
structed courts on how to assess the "reasonableness" of an agency's
pace under the APA or enabling statutes imposing similar "reasonable
time" requirements on agency action. The approach developed in the
lower courts is ad hoc, incoherent, and difficult to apply consistently.
The courts consider a mishmash of factors, but in the end, typically
weigh the interests of the individuals harmed by delay against the
agency's interest in controlling the manner and pace of its decision-
making, thus using an individual-rights framework without any of the
constitutional bite. 28 The weak and ad hoc judicial review of agency
delays creates opportunities for agencies and those who shape their
decisionmaking to thwart legislative mandates. 29
This Article reconceives agency delay as a principal-agent prob-
lem between congressional enacting coalitions and the agency, rather
than merely a conflict between the agency and its beneficiaries, as the
problem has traditionally been understood. 3 0 In political science and
24 See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156
U. PA. L. REV 923, 933 (2008) ("[I]t will generally be more difficult for Congress to distinguish
'good delay' from 'bad delay' than 'good regulation from 'bad regulation."').
25 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, 701-706 (2006).
26 Id. § 555(b).
27 Id. § 706(1).
28 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (outlining the most common approach used by the lower courts to evaluate agency delays);
see also In re Core Commc'ns., Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Independence Mining
Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1997).
29 See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 188
(2008) (criticizing the weakness of judicial review of agency inaction).
30 Of course, adjudicatory delays can also raise constitutional due process concerns, Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) ("At some point, a delay in the post-
termination hearing would become a constitutional violation."), but generally the delay must be
quite extreme, compare Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980) (three-year and
nine-month delay in processing disability application violates due process), with Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 342 (1976) (one year delay in final decision on appeal of termination of
disability benefits does not violate due process).
1388 [Vol. 79:1381
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economics, the "principal-agent problem" describes the challenge of
ensuring that an agent pursues the interests of its principal given the
agent's opportunities for self-dealing due to the information asymme-
tries inherent in the relationship and to the potential for divergent
interests.3' Positive political theorists have long used the principal-
agent framework to describe the problem confronted by Congress in
controlling the discretionary authority delegated to the administrative
state.3 2 Due to limitations on Congress's ability to monitor and con-
trol ex post agency action, there is always a risk of agency drift in
which the agency's actions diverge from the policy preferences of the
congressional enacting coalition-i.e., the members of Congress that,
with or without the President, passed the underlying statute giving rise
to the agency's duty to act. The principal-agent relationship between
the enacting coalition and the agency (i.e., the delegation of decision-
making authority) creates opportunities for delay, which the agency or
powerful competing principals-such as the President, interest groups,
regulated industries, and influential members of Congress-can use to
thwart the enacting coalition's legislative goals.
Framing agency delays as a principal-agent problem calls for a
doctrine that (1) identifies sources of delay that undermine the
agency's political accountability, such as agency capture by regulated
31 See Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 739, 756
(1984) ("[T]here is no guarantee that the agent .. . will ... choose to pursue the principal's best
interests or to do so efficiently. The agent has his own interests .. . and is induced to pursue the
principal's objectives only to the extent that the incentive structure imposed in their contract
renders such behavior advantageous.").
32 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins, et al., Administrative
Procedures] (using the principal-agent framework to analyze congressional control of the admin-
istrative state); Matthew D. McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admin-
istrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989)
[hereinafter McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process] (same); Moe, supra note 31, at 758 (noting
early uses of the principal-agent model by political scientists studying public bureaucracy). The
principal-agent framework has also made some inroads into normative legal scholarship that
engages positive political theory. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58
DUKE L.J. 549 (2009) (reimagining judicial interpretation of congressional delegation using the
insights of positive political theory); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Imple-
menting an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989) (developing a theory
of judicial review using the principal-agent framework); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Polit-
ical Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.O. 1, 50-51 (1994) (noting the difficulties
of applying the principal-agent framework to the relationship between the President, Congress,
the courts, and the administrative state); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Dele-
gated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1035 (2006) (analyzing congressional decisions whether to delegate decisionmaking authority to
agencies or courts as a principal-agent problem).
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industries, agency shirking of legislative mandates, or obstructionism
by Presidents opposed to legislative goals; (2) tailors judicial defer-
ence to an agency's pace according to the type of decision delegated
by Congress; (3) judges the reasonableness of an agency timeline by
whether it enables the agency to make a sufficiently better decision,
such that the costs to the enacting coalition's goals are outweighed by
the benefits of further time for decisionmaking; and (4) provides agen-
cies with better incentives to rationally prioritize their many
responsibilities.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the causes
and consequences of delay in both administrative programs and regu-
latory initiatives. It identifies delays that can be appropriately charac-
terized as the result of a principal-agent problem as well as the limits
of the model. Part II delves into the jurisprudence of agency inaction
and elaborates on how the academic literature has not yet addressed
agency discretion over timing while the doctrine in the courts has been
ad hoc and too weak to ensure the efficient operation and accounta-
bility of the administrative state. Part III compares the institutional
capacities and competencies of the three branches to address agency
delays. It argues that information deficiencies and political and struc-
tural impediments make it difficult for Congress to cure certain de-
lays. Although the President is often in a better position to expedite
action related to administration priorities, the President has a ten-
dency to exacerbate delays in other areas. Consequently, the judiciary
is often the only branch of government willing and able to address
delays that thwart legislative goals. Part III concludes that courts are
in a better position than Congress to address many discrete agency
delays but less well equipped to review agency decisions regarding
priorities.
Finally, Part IV offers several proposals for enhancing political
and judicial review of agency delays that address them as a principal-
agent problem. Due to the vast number of responsibilities entrusted
to agency action-and the limited resources of the White House, Con-
gress, and the judiciary-tackling agency delays requires interbranch
cooperation and coordination.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH AGENCY DELAYS
A. The Causes of Agency Delays: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Some interval between the passage of legislation and its imple-
mentation is a necessary and beneficial consequence of congressional
[Vol. 79:13811390
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delegation of decisionmaking authority to the administrative state.3 3
Congress delegates decisions that it has neither the time nor the ex-
pertise to make, or to make efficiently.34 This is true of both adjudica-
tion and rulemaking proceedings delegated by Congress. In the case
of the adjudication of public benefits, for example, although Congress
often sets relatively specific criteria for eligibility,35 Congress does not
have the time to review, debate, and vote on the merits of benefits for
millions of individual applicants. 3 6 Moreover, a specialized adjudica-
tory agency can make iterative decisions more efficiently and fairly by
employing rules of general applicability. Similarly, in the case of regu-
latory standards, Congress has neither the time nor the expertise to
determine the tens of thousands of rules promulgated by the adminis-
trative state that give meaning and content to broad regulatory stat-
utes.37 Congress struggles simply to address all the legislation
proposed by its members each term.38
Public choice theorists have also identified less savory reasons for
Congress to delegate policymaking decisions to regulatory agencies.
Congress may wish to avoid setting specific regulatory standards for
33 See Pierce, supra note 32, at 1244 (noting the diminishing number of policy decisions
made by Congress); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 383 (1989) (noting that agencies must engage in either adjudication or
rulemaking to implement legislative directives).
34 This is known as the "public interest" theory of congressional delegation of broad pol-
icy-making authority. See Pierce, supra note 32, at 1245 & n.22; Richard B. Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1695-97 (1975) (discussing
reasons why Congress enacts broad and nonspecific legislation).
35 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427(a), (c), 1445(a)-(b) (2006) (eligibility criteria for natu-
ralization); 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006) (eligibility criteria for old-age insurance benefits under
Social Security Act); id. § 423(a)(1) (eligibility criteria for disability insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act).
36 Until the Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, however, Con-
gress sometimes retained the ability to overrule certain decisions of the administrative state,
although it exercised the power infrequently. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) (describing the history of the legislative veto in restraining agency
discretion).
37 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."); Kerwin & Furlong,
supra note 2, at 113 ("Serial delegations of vast regulatory powers by Congress in the 1970s and
1980s authorized the writing of tens of thousands of rules."). The policy choices confronting
agencies charged with protecting our health, safety, and the environment frequently require an
uncommon level of expertise and specialization. Id. at 116; see also Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (noting that agencies make decisions "at
the frontiers of science").
38 The 109th Congress (2005-2006) introduced 6540 bills but passed only 770 of them.
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 2008, at 124 (2008).
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fear of incurring the ire of a regulated constituency, 39 Congress may
be uncertain or unable to agree on the most politically desirable policy
choice to pursue,40 or Congress may wish to avoid the temptation to
shape important policy decisions based on short-term political expedi-
ency rather than the merits.4 1 Thus, there are advantages for Congress
to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies with the time and exper-
tise to make better decisions implementing broad policy objectives
than Congress itself could or would make, even if it had the time and
wherewithal to do so. 4 2
Agencies need time for quality decisionmaking when confronting
complex problems that require them to marshal and analyze a large
amount of information and to choose among competing policy alter-
natives.43 Thus, some delay in the implementation of statutory man-
dates is inevitable and desirable, so long as it produces decisions more
closely aligned with Congress's policy goals than Congress itself could
produce or than the agency could produce with less thoughtful
consideration.
39 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 81 (1991) (describing a theory positing that "members of Congress ... prefer
broad delegations so they can 'pass the buck' and avoid taking responsibility for the conse-
quences of legislation"); Pierce, supra note 32, at 1245 (noting that public choice theorists con-
tend that broad delegations to the agencies allow legislators to curry favor with constituencies
with conflicting policy preferences).
40 See Pierce, supra note 32, at 1246-47 (explaining that democratic reforms of Congress
broke the agenda-setting power of party leaders and committee chairs, sacrificing legislative
decisiveness).
41 See JERRY L. MASHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 68
(1990) (noting that Congress's ignorance with respect to auto safety led it to provide vague
directions to the administrative state in the hope that professionals would resolve the details);
McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 256-57 (noting that politicians
may delegate when they are unsure of what the best policy would be); Glen 0. Robinson, Com-
mentary, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies":
Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 485 (1989) (noting that some scholars
have explained legislative delegations as reflecting "the legislature's lack of relevant information
or uncertainty due to frequent changes in the state of knowledge").
42 The relative impotence of the nondelegation doctrine means that there is little judicial
check on broad delegations of decisionmaking authority to the agencies. See, e.g., Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that the Court had only twice invalidated
a statute under the doctrine). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1407, 1429-30 (2008) (suggesting that Congress has exceeded even the weak limits that the
Court places on the delegation of decisionmaking authority).
43 See KERWIN, supra note 2, at 107-08 (describing the complexity of issues often faced by
rulemaking agencies). Of course, the procedural requirements imposed upon agencies by the
APA also delay final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (requiring that agencies
provide notice of proposed actions and allow opportunity for comment); id. §§ 556-557 (laying
out more stringent procedures for formal rulemaking).
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But delays in agency decisionmaking are not always caused by the
agency's desire to produce a decision that is more faithful to the goals
of the enacting coalition. Delays may also stem from divergent policy
preferences of the agency or a competing political principal, from
agency mismanagement or inefficiencies unrelated to policy prefer-
ences, or from Congress's failure to provide the agency with the re-
sources necessary to achieve its mandated goals.
1. Agency Priorities
In a world of limited resources, agencies prioritize their agendas
and defer initiating or prolong completing matters they deem less
pressing. On the one hand, to the extent that agencies prioritize based
on the most important or time-sensitive legislative goals, such deci-
sions do not raise concerns of democratic accountability because the
agency is not attempting to thwart a legislative mandate. On the other
hand, the agency may deem a matter to be a low priority merely be-
cause it involves a new area in which the agency does not have experi-
ence, expertise, or contacts.44 The agency may also stall because of
disagreement among agency staff over the proper course of action or
fear of the political costs of a decision.4 5 More troubling still, agency
staff may ignore a mandate from Congress that differs from the
agency's understanding of its mission, what positive political scientists
call "agency drift."46 Such policy preferences raise democratic ac-
countability concerns because the agency is using delay, intentionally
or unintentionally, to diverge from the enacting coalition's policy
goals.
2. "Agency Capture"
In its extreme form, "agency capture" denotes an agency that is
effectively controlled by an industry that it regulates.47 Consequently,
44 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 101 (new ed. 2000) ("[T]asks that are not part of the [agency] culture will not be
attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it.").
45 KERWIN, supra note 2, at 108-09, 113-14.
46 See McCubbins, et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 184 (1999) ("Agency drift refers to the circumstance when an agency adopts
policies that are not consistent with the agreement among elected officials that is embodied in its
statutory mandate .... ); McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process, supra note 32, at 435-40
(modeling agency drift within the parameters of certain legislative preferences).
47 The concept has its roots in public choice theory's view of the political process as driven
by economic rather than ideological interests. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3, 3 (1971). For a classic study of capture in
four agencies, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
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the agency's policies are manipulated to serve the interests of the reg-
ulated industry rather than the intended beneficiaries of congressional
action, even if Congress intends some benefits to accrue to the indus-
try itself.48 But many commentators have recognized a subtler agency
bias towards the interests of regulated industries.4 9 Because agencies
generally have limited resources, they often rely on regulated parties
for information, encouraging the agency to develop a productive
working relationship with the industry.50  Moreover, an adversarial
posture toward the regulated industry is expensive and potentially
dangerous for the agency. A well-organized industry backed up
against a wall might take its complaint to Congress and succeed in
gutting the agency's funding or altering its mandate, and litigation has
uncertain outcomes. 51 Thus, agencies generally prefer to foster volun-
(1981). See also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990) (reviewing agency
capture literature); Stewart, supra note 34, at 1685 & nn.75-76. The primary mechanism of cap-
ture traditionally has been assumed to be the prospect of future employment in the regulated
industry. See QUIRK, supra, at 143-74.
48 For example, the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service ("MMS"),
which allocates oil and gas exploration rights and collects about ten billion dollars in royalties
annually from the oil and gas industry, was recently accused of literally being in bed with its
regulated industry. See Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2008, at Al. Officials at MMS reportedly accepted gifts from energy com-
panies in violation of ethics rules, used drugs and alcohol at industry functions, had sexual rela-
tionships with industry representatives, and obtained outside consulting jobs with the companies
with which the agency conducted business. Id. As a result of this "capture," the MMS allowed
companies that purchased oil and gas to revise their bids downward after winning contracts on
118 occasions, costing taxpayers over four million dollars. Id. The costs of MMS's capture be-
came manifest in the wake of the gulf oil spill, which many blamed on MMS's failure to issue
adequate safety rules. See Richard S. Dunham & Stewart Powell, Critics Blame Energy Lobby
for Lax Safety Rules, Hous. CHRON., May 8, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/busi-
ness/deepwaterhorizon/6996736.html. The criticisms were so strong that they forced an overhaul
of MMS in an attempt to insulate it from industry influence. See Mike Soraghan, Interior's New
Oil Industry Watchdog Has Little Energy Experience, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, http://www.ny
times.com/gwire/2010/06/16/16greenwire-interiors-new-oil-industry-watchdog-has-little-43108.
html.
49 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 34, at 1684-87 (arguing that agencies are predisposed to
favor interests of regulated industry because (1) they are held accountable if industry suffers
serious economic harm, (2) regulation may reduce competition, solidifying position of key play-
ers and their relation to the agency, (3) limited resources make conflict with the regulated indus-
try costly or impossible, and (4) agencies must rely on outside resources and information, much
of which comes from the regulated industry).
50 Id. at 1686.
51 For example, after the National Traffic Safety Administration ("NTSA") proposed pas-
sive-restraint safety regulations in 1969, Inflatable Occupant Restraint Systems, 34 Fed. Reg.
11,148 (proposed July 2, 1969), the automobile industry fought the agency both in court and the
halls of Congress, ultimately securing an amendment to the Motor Vehicle Safety Act to empha-
size recalls of defective automobiles over technology-forcing safety standards, see Motor Vehicle
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tary cooperation and compliance, which inevitably demands com-
promises. Because regulated industries with significant interests at
stake also tend to be well organized and able to lobby the agency ef-
fectively, whereas intended beneficiaries of legislation are often dif-
fuse and poorly organized, the agency's policies tend to tilt in favor of
the regulated industry. 52
There are several ways in which a regulated industry can delay
agency decisionmaking: the industry can signal to the agency that it
will fight particular regulation, motivating the agency to work on
other less contentious issues to preserve a cooperative relationship;
the industry can delay responding to requests for information or oth-
erwise interfere with research, making it difficult for the agency to
obtain the knowledge necessary to formulate policy;5 3 or alternatively,
the industry can churn the administrative record as the agency moves
forward with regulation, producing pro-industry studies and threaten-
ing legal action if the agency closes the administrative record or does
not adequately consider the industry's submissions.54
Regulated industries should be heard on the substantive policies
that affect them given that Congress rarely intends the ruin of an in-
dustry. But postponing or prolonging decisionmaking to thwart an en-
acting coalition's policy goals, as opposed to delaying the
implementation of regulations as a part of a negotiated compromise,
raises democratic accountability and transparency concerns.
and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 152, 88 Stat. 1470, 1470-71
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2006)). For two different accounts of the death of NTSA's
passive-restraint proposal, see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 41, and Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
251, 315-20 (2009).
52 See MANCUR OLsoN, THE Locc OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (7th prtg. 1977) (explaining that small, organized groups are often
more effective than larger groups); Pierce, supra note 32, at 1280-81; Stewart, supra note 34, at
1684-85 (arguing that small groups with large stakes in an agency's decision can overwhelm
larger groups' abilities to influence agency action).
53 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Unreasonable Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The Battle
to Force Regulation of Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 190, 208-11 (Peter L.
Strauss ed., 2006) (explaining how off-the-record meetings with industry led to the halting of a
crucial agency study, the absence of which was later used to justify agency inaction).
54 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that rulemaking had been delayed when industry groups pressured the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to wait for the results of ongoing studies); Amy Whritenour
Ando, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29, 48-50 (1999) (noting interest group influence on the rates
at which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service lists endangered species).
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3. Presidential Priorities
The President can delay the implementation of regulations con-
trary to the administration's goals, at least with respect to executive
branch agencies that are not insulated from presidential control.
Upon taking office, the George W. Bush Administration announced
that any new regulatory actions would have to be reviewed and ap-
proved by a department or agency head appointed by the new Admin-
istration,55 effectively suspending regulatory action during the
nomination and confirmation process. Once Bush's nominees were in
place, the Administration and its appointees continued to check the
pace of regulatory activity, particularly with respect to health, safety,
and the environment. 56 Indeed, the fear of a negative White House
response is often enough to deter agencies from acting contrary to the
President's preferences.57 Moreover, merely by focusing the attention
of agencies on administration priorities, the President can divert re-
sources from other activities.58 Thus, even a President committed to
an activist government, such as President Obama, 59 may cause delays
in certain areas by pushing agencies in others.
Although advocates of strong presidential control over the ad-
ministrative state extol it as a solution to the problem of democratic
legitimacy,60 unchecked agency inaction caused by the President con-
stitutes an extralegislative veto on duly enacted statutes. Thus, delays
55 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 314 F.3d at 150.
56 See Declaration of Peter Lurie, M.D., M.P.H. 24 & Ex. 19, Pub. Citizen Health Re-
search Grp., 314 F.3d 143 (No. 02-1611) (stating that OSHA's agenda in 2001 included few
rulemaking proceedings and no proposals to regulate in new areas); KERWIN, supra note 2, at
109-10 (noting that policy disagreements between political appointees and career bureaucrats
can prolong rulemaking proceedings); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v.
EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Cr. REv. 51, 55 (reviewing White House pressure to
block climate change regulation by the EPA); Duhigg, supra note 9 (recounting the EPA's inac-
tion under the SDWA).
57 Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1986).
58 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 314 F.3d at 147, 157 (explaining that OSHA
delayed regulating hexavalent chromium due to the Clinton Administration's push to quickly
develop ergonomics standards); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1431 (1992) ("[Rlulemaking initiatives that are low on
OMB's agenda languish, even if they are high priorities for the agencies."); Vladeck, supra note
53, at 198 (noting that OSHA justified a delay in regulating ethylene oxide due to focus on the
Reagan Administration's deregulatory efforts).
59 See Lipton, supra note 13.
60 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570 (1994) (arguing that the text of the Constitution "unambigu-
ously gives the President the power to control the execution of all federal laws"); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2252 (2001) (arguing that presidential in-
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caused by presidential priorities raise democratic accountability and
separation of powers concerns.6'
4. Congressional Capture
Members of Congress can exert pressure on agencies to defer or
postpone regulatory actions, particularly if they sit on a congressional
committee with oversight responsibility for the agency or power over
appropriations. 62 The mere threat of adverse congressional action
may cause agencies to shy away from certain matters and shape their
priorities. Indeed, some political scientists argue that Congress en-
courages agency delay in decisionmaking so that members of Con-
gress can influence the regulatory process if they do not approve of
the direction in which the agency is headed. 63 Although members of
Congress can hardly be faulted for advocating on behalf of their con-
stituents,64 agency capture by individual members of Congress or con-
gressional committees raises accountability and transparency concerns
by functioning as an extralegislative stealth veto on agency action.
5. Agency Mismanagement
Some agency delays are the result of simple mismanagement or
administrative inefficiencies. 65 Mismanagement may go unchecked
because of divergent policy preferences of the agency, but it may be
completely unrelated. 66 Agencies, like humans, sometimes make mis-
takes and often do not work as efficiently as they might in an ideal
fluence on administrative regulation "renders the bureaucratic sphere more transparent and re-
sponsive to the public").
61 Cf Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) (emphasizing the complex separation of pow-
ers and democratic implications of political involvement in the administrative process); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-79 (1984) (same).
62 See KERWIN, supra note 2, at 112 (describing how a congressional appropriations com-
mittee pressured an agency to rescind an offer to aid the Department of Transportation with
establishing rules for alcohol testing of public transportation workers); Jack M. Beermann, Con-
gressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 61, 130-35 (2006) (describing informal efforts
by members of Congress to influence agency decisions to take or forego actions).
63 McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process, supra note 32, at 442.
64 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("We believe it entirely
proper for Congressional representatives vigorously to represent the interests of their constitu-
ents before administrative agencies . . . so long as individual Congressmen do not frustrate the
intent of Congress ... as expressed in statute .... ).
65 See KoCH, supra note 20, § 11:52, at 183 ("While there are many practical excuses for
delay, delay must be justified.").
66 See Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 259 (noting that agency determinations of whether to
act are sometimes made "in a purposive manner" based on specific agency goals, but that other
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world. Mismanagement and inefficiencies do not necessarily under-
mine accountability or transparency, but they can still raise concerns
about the efficient functioning of the agency from a principal-agent
perspective.
6. Dysfunctional Principals
Finally, some delays, particularly in the context of large screening
programs, such as the adjudication of benefits, patents, licenses, and
the like, are caused in whole or in part by the failure of Congress to
appropriate sufficient funds to get the job done. The enacting coali-
tion may have passed the underlying legislation for purely symbolic
reasons and may not actually want the agency to engage in much regu-
latory or administrative activity, or it may prefer that the agency move
slowly. 67 Alternatively, the current Congress may not share the policy
goals of the original enacting coalition and, rather than attempt to re-
peal or significantly amend the underlying statute, may prefer to let
the program wither on the vine by cutting the agency's funding. In
such cases, the delays that ensue are the result of a dysfunctional prin-
cipal (i.e., Congress) rather than a principal-agent problem.
In sum, agency delays constitute a principal-agent problem that
raises democratic accountability concerns when foot-dragging stems
from divergent policy preferences of the agency itself, a regulated in-
terest group, or a competing political principal acting outside the legis-
lative process. In many cases, delay is a more effective strategy for
competing principals seeking to obstruct legislative goals than shaping
the agency's substantive decisions, which would likely result in judicial
review against the standards in the enabling statute. 68 Similarly, de-
lays caused by agency mismanagement and inefficiencies raise basic
principal-agent concerns, although they do not raise the same con-
cerns with democratic accountability or separation of powers as diver-
gent policy preferences. Finally, delays that are mostly a function of
inadequate congressional appropriations do not constitute a principal-
agent problem at all; rather they are indicative of a dysfunctional
principal.
times "the problems agencies decide to address are a matter of the coincidence of a variety of
factors conducive to agency action").
67 See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 234
(1990) (noting that agencies often respond to symbolic legislation by resisting or delaying its
implementation).
68 See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 24, at 932-33.
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B. The Costs of Agency Delays
The failure by agencies to implement statutory mandates ob-
structs the bestowal of economic and social goods on intended benefi-
ciaries of legislative action.69 Injured workers and veterans who wait
for disability benefits to be adjudicated must scramble for support in
the interim; lawful permanent residents who await the adjudication of
their citizenship applications remain separated from family members,
face the risk of deportation, and cannot fully participate in our politi-
cal system.70 But agency delays do not merely affect applicants for
public entitlements. Delays by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") in approving new prescription drugs and medical devices af-
fect one of our most dynamic industries. While the FDA reviews a
new drug application, the company must wait to recoup the costs of
development and the profitability of the drug diminishes as the clock
runs on the company's patents.71
Moreover, agency delays reallocate enacting coalitions' intended
distribution of costs and benefits over time. Put differently, delays
impose unintended costs on intended beneficiaries and unintended
benefits on those intended to bear the costs of regulation.72 Consider
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"), 73
which requires-the Occupational Safety and Healthy Administration
("OSHA") to set standards that "eliminat[e], as far as feasible, signifi-
cant risks of harm" in the workplace. 74 The OSH Act provides a ben-
efit to workers by reducing the risk of illness caused by hazards in the
workplace and imposes a cost on employers by requiring them to meet
stricter workplace safety standards. Delays by OSHA in setting stan-
69 See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 2, at 115 ("Without the rules needed to specify the
form and content of programs, the obligations of regulated parties, and the responsibilities of
enforcement officials, the public policy objectives articulated in statutes cannot be pursued.").
70 See Roshandel v. Chertoff, No. C07-1739MJP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90899, at *3
(W.D. Wash. May 5, 2008) (describing the injuries alleged by plaintiffs whose applications for
citizenship had been delayed for multiple years).
71 See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1035
(1983) ("[U]nder screening systems it is the regulatee who bears the risk and cost of regulatory
delay."). These delays also affect the patient populations that need these drugs. In 1990, the
chairman of a presidential advisory panel on drug approval estimated that thousands of lives
were lost each year due to delays by the FDA in approving cancer and AIDS drugs. Robert
Pear, Faster Approval of AIDS Drugs Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at 112.
72 See Huber, supra note 71, at 1035 n.44 (discussing how drug-approval delays at the FDA
harmed the patients the regulations were intended to help by withholding lifesaving medication).
73 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
74 Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641 (1980) (plurality
opinion); see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (granting OSHA the power to set standards and providing
guidelines for their issuance).
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dards for workplace hazards deny workers intended benefits of the
OSH Act and provide employers with a windfall by postponing the
intended costs. Decades-long delays in implementing or updating
such standards can have significant redistributive effects, which are
difficult if not impossible to correct.75
Or consider the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act 76 and the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation
Act,77 the products of the Obama Administration's push for health-
care reform. Congress drafted the law in such a way that various con-
sumer protections become effective at different times over the next
decade.78 Delays by the agencies tasked with implementing the legis-
lation could alter this schedule significantly, reducing the law's value
to consumers and creating a windfall for the insurance industry.
Agency delays also create uncertainty among regulated entities,
making it difficult for them to plan for the future.79 For example, de-
lays in promulgating pollution emission standards make it difficult for
businesses to plan new projects or capital improvements;80 more cost
effective alternatives in the short run might need to be replaced in a
few years once the agency acts."' Alternatively, because agencies tend
to regulate new construction more aggressively than existing plants,8 2
delay may encourage businesses to preempt the agency to obtain the
benefit of grandfathered status, further diminishing the benefits in-
tended to be delivered by the enacting coalition.8 3 Moreover, regard-
75 Tort suits may be cold comfort to injured, seriously ill, or deceased workers.
76 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
77 Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010).
78 For a helpful summary of the effective dates of major provisions of the laws, see THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, TIMELINE FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION: HEALTH IN-
SURANCE PROVISIONs (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files[Pub-
lications/Other/2010/TimelineCoverage_818v4.pdf.
79 KERWIN, supra note 2, at 106.
80 Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[E]xcessive
delay . . . creates uncertainty for the parties, who must incorporate the potential effect of possi-
ble agency decisionmaking into future plans."); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002,
1010 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that delay can threaten introduction of new technology); Nader v.
FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that excessive delay can lead to the breakdown
of the regulatory process).
81 See Huber, supra note 71, at 1064 & n.180 ("[Rietrofitting is anathema to engineering
cost accountants because it is usually vastly more costly than making an identical but prospective
change in design.").
82 Id. at 1040-41.
83 See generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environ-
mental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677
(2007) (analyzing systemic effects of grandfathering in environmental law).
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less of how the entity decides to proceed in the face of uncertainty, the
failure of the agency to give specificity to legislative acts will increase
the costs of obtaining legal advice concerning the meaning and import
of the law.84
The uncertainty produced by delay can also create conflicts
among regulated parties. In 1962, Congress required the FDA to re-
view the efficacy of 16,573 prescription drugs that had been approved
under the preexisting regulatory regime for safety but not efficacy.85
Manufacturers were permitted to continue marketing the drugs until
the FDA set new standards.8 6 But the FDA still has not finished re-
viewing all the drugs within the class.87 In 2006, the FDA estimated
that there were thousands of unapproved drug products, representing
hundreds of drugs, on the market.88 The FDA's delay in reviewing
these products led to dozens of lawsuits among competing pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers over the products' advertising and promotional
claims. 9 In the absence of definitive FDA judgments about the prod-
ucts' efficacy, juries had to do the FDA's job in a series of false adver-
tising lawsuits across the country.
Finally, prolonged decisionmaking is inefficient for the agency.
As rulemaking proceedings drag on, the agency must continue to re-
view new information, old findings must be revisited, new personnel
must be trained as staff depart, and the agency's institutional memory
is inevitably diminished. Moreover, as the number of delayed matters
multiply and continue to consume agency resources, they impair the
84 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
622-23 (1992).
85 PIERCE, supra note 8, § 12.3, at 847.
86 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, MARKETED UNAPPROVED DRUGS-COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 9 (2006), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guide-
ances/UCM070290.pdf ("It is the Agency's longstanding policy that products subject to an ongo-
ing ... proceeding may remain on the market during the pendency of the proceeding.").
87 See id. at 8-9
88 Id. at 2; see also Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., No. 98-4606, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1761, 1763 (11th Cir. May 11, 1999) (depublished) ("[T]here are still
thousands of these unapproved drugs on the market."); Solvay Pharm., Inc. v. Ethex Corp., No.
03-2836(JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 2255375, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2006) (noting that, even though
the FDA had declared that pancreatic enzymes would require approval by the agency, it had not
set its own standards for the drugs).
89 See, e.g., Solvay Pharm., Inc, No. 03-2836(JRTIFLN), 2006 WL 2255375; Solvay Pharm.,
Inc. v. Global Pharm., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Minn. 2006); Schwarz Pharm., Inc. v. Brecken-
ridge Pharm., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Healthpoint Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No.
SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004).
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ability of the agency to focus its attention and resources on new
priorities.90
In sum, although it is important for agencies to have the neces-
sary time to make quality decisions under the authority delegated to
them, excessive and unnecessary delays in decisionmaking can have
serious consequences inasmuch as the administrative state touches
upon nearly every aspect of our lives.
II. THE LAW OF AGENCY ACrION, INACTION, AND DELAY
Legal scholars have devoted little attention to judicial review of
agency delays or to the role that courts might play in curing them.
When agency delays do appear in the academic literature, scholars
usually treat them as a form of agency inaction.91 The literature fo-
cuses on the nonreviewability and standing doctrines and whether
there is any meaningful distinction between judicial review of agency
action and inaction.92 The literature has not addressed how courts
should assess whether agency decisionmaking has become unreasona-
bly delayed.
90 See DAVID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE '70s, at 180 (2000) (noting that all but one
of the fourteen drugs that the FDA categorized as priorities in the 1970s were approved in for-
eign countries before the United States).
91 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 20, at 13; Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin,
supra note 20, at 467; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 673. But see KOCH, supra note 20, § 11:52, at
183 (noting that "delay might be a different conceptual category from a choice of inaction"
because it "is not the exercise of discretion or any other type of decisionmaking but rather is the
result of agency failures"); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 56, at 81 (discussing reasons why
agencies may delay decisionmaking); Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 24 (conducting an empiri-
cal study of deadlines in rulemaking proceedings and their affect on the pace of agency action).
In contrast to the dearth of literature on delay in administrative law, there is a sizable body
of literature discussing delays in criminal proceedings. See generally Harold J. Krent, The Con-
tinuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 53 (2005) (discussing Fourth Amendment limitations to delays in criminal proceedings);
Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115 (2008)
(considering legislative and judicial responses to pre-indictment delays); Michael J. Cleary, Com-
ment, Pre-Indictment Delay: Establishing a Fairer Approach Based on United States v. Marion
and United States v. Lovasco, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1049 (2005) (discussing judicial responses to
constitutional pre-indictment delay claims); Preliminary Proceedings: Prosecutorial Discretion,
38 GEo. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 219, 220 n.668 (2009) (discussing constitutional protections
against delays in criminal procedural system).
92 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 20, at 13; Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin,
supra note 20, at 467; Bressman, supra note 21, at 1678-84; Pierce, supra note 32, at 1267-68;
Sunstein, supra note 20, at 660.
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A. Review of Agency Action, Inaction, and Delay Under the
Administrative Procedure Act
The APA provides the basic framework for judicial review of
agency action, inaction, and delays. The APA defines "agency action"
to include "the whole or a part of any agency rule, order, license, sanc-
tion, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 9 3
Any person "suffering legal wrong . . . or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action" 94 or inaction95 is entitled to judicial review
unless the relevant statutes "preclude judicial review" or the agency's
action or inaction is "committed to agency discretion by law."96 Agen-
cies are required to conclude matters presented to them in a "reasona-
ble time" 97 and courts may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed." 98
In addition to the APA's restrictions on unreasonable delay,
many enabling statutes governing specific agencies and their programs
contain express statutory deadlines or provisions similar to the APA's
requirement that agencies either expressly or impliedly complete cer-
tain actions within a reasonable time.99 Most courts take the position
that an agency must abide by an express statutory deadline, and man-
damus is required if the agency misses the deadline.100 But courts
93 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).
94 Id. § 702.
95 See id. § 551(13) (defining agency action to include "failure to act"); id. § 701(b)(2)
(noting that "agency action," as used in chapter seven of 5 U.S.C., is defined by § 551(13)).
96 Id. § 701(a)(1)-(2).
97 Id. § 555(b).
98 Id. § 706(1).
99 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360f(b) (2006) (requiring "prompt notice . . . [and] reasonable
opportunity for an informal hearing" on proposed regulations to ban devices under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act); 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (2006) (directing the Secretary of Labor to notify
employers of a penalty "within a reasonable time after the termination of [an] inspection or
investigation" under the Occupational Safety and Health Act); 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) (2006)
(authorizing the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to compel action "unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed"); 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006) (entitling disability claimants under the
Social Security Act to "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to" unfa-
vorable disability determinations); id. § 7409(a)(1)(B) (directing the EPA Administrator to pro-
mulgate proposed national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act "after a
reasonable time for interested persons to submit written comments thereon (but no later than 90
days after the initial publication of such proposed standards)").
100 See, e.g., In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (compelling
agency rulemaking in light of "a clear statutory mandate, a deadline nine-years ignored, and an
agency that has admitted its continuing recalcitrance"); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d
1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The agency must act by the deadline. If it withholds such timely
action, a reviewing court must compel the action unlawfully withheld. To hold otherwise would
be an affront to our tradition of legislative supremacy and constitutionally separated powers.").
But see In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[F]inding that delay is unreason-
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struggle to judge the reasonableness of an agency's pace when Con-
gress has not provided a statutory deadline.ot
B. Heckler v. Chaney and the Literature of Agency Inaction
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Cha-
ney, 102 there was some question whether agency inaction was generally
reviewable at all. In Chaney, the Court interpreted section 706(a)(2)
of the APA to hold that agency decisions not to institute enforcement
proceedings are presumptively immune from judicial review.10 3 The
plaintiffs in Chaney were prison inmates convicted of capital offenses
and sentenced to death who petitioned the FDA to take enforcement
actions concerning drugs used in lethal injections to carry out the
death penalty.104 The plaintiffs alleged that the drugs were not ap-
proved for use in human executions (although approved for other
uses) and therefore such use violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA").10 The agency argued that it was not required to un-
dertake any enforcement action because (1) it did not have jurisdic-
tion over state criminal justice systems; and (2) even if it did have
jurisdiction, it would exercise its inherent discretion not to pursue en-
forcement proceedings based on the Commissioner's conclusion that
there was no "serious danger to the public health or a blatant scheme
able does not, alone, justify judicial intervention."); R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots of the
Judicial Dilemma, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 585, 596-97 (1997) (criticizing statutory deadlines and
urging courts to deny standing to enforce them).
101 Agency interpretations of the APA are not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the courts, rather
than the agencies, administer the APA. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50
(1990) (rejecting Chevron deference to agency's interpretation of a statute because the agency
did not administer the statute); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 174 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (same); Prof'l Reactor Operator Soc'y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(denying Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of the APA because Congress did not
assign the agency a special role in construing it); Air N. Am. v. Dep't. of Transp., 937 F.2d 1427,
1436-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judi-
cial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 312 (1988)
("[W]hen a court concludes that Congress left unresolved a policy issue in a statute that is not
administered by an agency, the court should acknowledge explicitly that it must resolve the pol-
icy issue . . . ."); cf Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (holding that courts should defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are entrusted by Congress to administer
unless their interpretations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute). Con-
gress did not entrust the administration of the APA to a particular agency; rather the APA
regulates the actions of multiple and diverse agencies.
102 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
103 Id. at 832-33.
104 Id. at 823.
105 Id. at 823-24; see also Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006).
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to defraud."10 6 The prisoners sought judicial review of the FDA's re-
fusal to act under the APA. 07
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that "an
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's ab-
solute discretion" under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.108 The Court
presented four reasons why the refusal to institute enforcement pro-
ceedings were generally unsuitable for judicial review. First, it rea-
soned that the decision whether to enforce involves a complex
balancing of several factors peculiarly within an agency's expertise,
including whether a violation has occurred, whether agency resources
are best spent on that violation or another, whether the enforcement
proceeding is likely to succeed, whether the action best fits the
agency's overall policies, and whether the agency has enough re-
sources to undertake the action at all.109 Second, the Court believed
that an agency's refusal to act "generally does not exercise its coercive
power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does
not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to pro-
tect."110 Third, the Court was concerned that agency inaction did not
provide the same focus for judicial review as agency action.",1 And
fourth, the Court suggested that an agency decision not to act "shares
to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in
the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as
it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" 1 12
The Court explained that Congress could limit an agency's en-
forcement discretion "either by setting substantive priorities, or by
otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among is-
sues or cases it will pursue."113 By contrast, the enforcement provi-
106 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at 825.
108 Id. at 831. The Court claimed that it had "recognized [this principle] on several occa-
sions over many years." Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 832.
111 Id.
112 Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3).
113 Id. at 833. The Court cited the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006), at issue in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975), as a statute circumscribing an agency's discretion to act. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833. The
LMRDA provided that upon filing of a complaint by a union member, "[tihe Secretary shall
investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation . . . has
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sions of the FDCA, the Court held, do not circumscribe the FDA's
inherent discretion to decide which enforcement actions to pursue.114
Although the Court announced a presumption against reviewabil-
ity only for agency decisions not to undertake enforcement proceed-
ings (and carved out some exceptions at that),"5 because three of the
Court's four rationales arguably applied to agency inaction more
broadly, Chaney generated interest among legal scholars about its ap-
plicability to other types of agency inaction. Several scholars have
criticized the presumption against reviewability of enforcement deci-
sions as well as any distinction in the reviewability of agency action
and inaction." 6 Professor Cass Sunstein argues that the Court in Cha-
ney had upset a workable standard of reviewability set forth in Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.117 Regardless of whether
a plaintiff complains about action or inaction, the question for a court,
according to Professor Sunstein, is whether the governing statute im-
poses legal restraints on the action or inaction at issue. 18 The key is
simply whether the court has a way to judge the plaintiff's claim based
on (1) the governing substantive statute, which will "almost always set
out standards by which to assess the legality of agency behavior or to
evaluate a claim of arbitrariness," and (2) "the precise allegation
made by the plaintiff." 119
occurred .. .he shall . .. bring a civil action . 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). Thus, the statute required
the Secretary to file suit if certain factors were present and the decision whether or not to act
was consequently appropriate for judicial review. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834.
114 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837.
115 The Court expressly disavowed the applicability of its holding to situations in which
(1) an agency refuses to institute enforcement proceedings based on the belief that it lacks juris-
diction; (2) an agency has adopted a policy "so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities"; or (3) an agency's refusal to institute proceedings violates a constitu-
tional right. Id. at 833 n.4, 838. Justice Brennan in his concurrence noted these exceptions to the
rule and suggested that the Court also did not address cases in which an agency refuses to en-
force a regulation lawfully promulgated. Id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-44 (1983)).
116 See Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin, supra note 20, at 467; Bressman, supra note 21,
at 1661; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 658-60. Professor Sunstein attributes the Court's opinion in
Chaney to an effort to restrict the role of the federal judiciary in supervising the administrative
state, particularly with respect to suits by beneficiaries of regulatory statutes. Id. at 660. The
tools used by the Court to implement this project are the doctrines of nonreviewability and
standing. Id. Professor Bressman ascribes the Court's approach to its solicitude for preserving
presidential control of enforcement priorities. Bressman, supra note 21, at 1678-79.
117 Sunstein, supra note 20, at 658-60 (discussing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
118 Id. at 659.
119 Id. at 658.
1406 [Vol. 79:1381
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1406 2010-2011
AGENCY DELAYS
Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman suggests that the Court has
overlooked a better understanding of nonreviewability grounded in
the political question doctrine.1 20 Nonreviewability as an analog of the
political question doctrine would "prevent[ ] courts from examining
conduct committed to the unfettered discretion of administrative offi-
cials." 121 Professor Bressman advocates using the political question
test articulated in Baker v. Carr,1 22 which focuses on "(1) 'a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department'; [and] (2) 'a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.' "123
Professor Eric Biber also eschews any fundamental distinction
between agency action and inaction but argues that courts should "de-
fer to agency decisions regarding resource allocations" and that
"[s]uch decisions are almost always implicated when a court is consid-
ering a claim that an agency has not acted, or has not acted quickly
enough." 1 24 Thus, the Supreme Court's immunization of certain types
of agency decisions from judicial review, such as decisions not to pur-
sue enforcement proceedings, is merely an extreme example of judi-
cial deference to agency resource allocation.125
Since Chaney, the Court has expanded the category of agency de-
cisions shielded from judicial review because they are "committed to
agency discretion" 126 to include agency refusals to grant reconsidera-
tion of an action, 127 agency employment termination decisions,128 and
agency allocation of lump-sum appropriations.12 9 But none of these
decisions turned on the action/inaction distinction that has concerned
scholars. Indeed, the Court did not even mention inaction in these
decisions and it would be hard to describe any of these cases as exam-
ples of inaction as they involved dissatisfaction with decisions that the
agencies had indeed made.
The next time the Court addressed a challenge to agency inaction,
in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA"), 130 the
120 Bressman, supra note 21, at 1662.
121 Id.
122 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
123 Bressman, supra note 21, at 1700 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
124 Biber, Two Sides of the Sarne Coin, supra note 20, at 467.
125 Id. at 488-89.
126 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).
127 ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 280 (1987).
128 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988).
129 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
130 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
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Court did not mention Chaney nor discuss any presumption of
nonreviewability. In SUWA, plaintiffs sought to compel the Depart-
ment of Interior, Bureau of Land Management to exclude off-road
vehicles from wilderness study areas pursuant to section 706(1) of the
APA and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,131
which directs the Secretary to "'manage such lands . .. in a manner so
as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilder-
ness."'132 The Court held that the APA did not contemplate courts
entering general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory
mandates.133 According to the Court, section 706(1) of the APA au-
thorizes courts to compel agency action only where the agency has
"failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take."13 4
Finally, in 2007, the Court settled any remaining debate about the
reach of Chaney with respect to denials of rulemaking petitions, at
least those that are expressly authorized by statute. In Massachusetts
v. EPA, 3 5 several states, local governments, and environmental orga-
nizations sought review of the EPA's denial of their rulemaking peti-
tion asking the EPA to regulate GhG emissions from new motor
vehicles under the CAA.13 6 The CAA provides that the EPA "shall by
regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any . .. new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle en-
gines, which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare."1 37
The EPA denied the petition on the grounds that (1) the CAA
did not give the EPA jurisdiction to issue regulations concerning
GhGs (in other words, GhGs did not constitute "air pollutants"), and
(2) even if the agency had authority to regulate GhGs, "it would be
unwise to do so at this time."' 3  Before the Court, the EPA defended
its interpretation of jurisdiction and contended that, even if it had ju-
131 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2006).
132 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59 (omission in original) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)).
133 Id. at 66-67.
134 Id. at 64. Thus, Professor Sunstein's criticism of Chaney and his prescription for review-
ing agency action and inaction may have carried the day. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 660.
135 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
136 Id. at 510, 514. The CAA provides the reviewing court with authority to overturn any
action that is "arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(9) (2006). Although the plaintiffs sought review of the EPA's denial under the CAA,
the Court's analysis regarding rulemaking and delay is equally applicable to suits under the
APA, which includes the same language. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006).
137 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
138 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 511.
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risdiction, the EPA had not exceeded its "considerable discretion" to
deny rulemaking petitions. 13 9 Although the EPA did not argue that
Chaney applied to rulemaking decisions, perhaps feeling constrained
by the D.C. Circuit's longstanding position that it did not,'14 0 the EPA
contended that the same considerations motivating Chaney applied to
the rulemaking decisions and therefore a "particularly deferential
standard applies on judicial review of such a decision."141
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the EPA had
jurisdiction to regulate GhG emissions,142 the EPA's discretion to
deny rulemaking petitions was subject to review,143 and the EPA had
abused its discretion by grounding its denial in nonstatutory factors.144
With respect to reviewability, the Court identified two "key differ-
ences" between rulemaking and enforcement decisions. 14 5 First,
rulemaking decisions are "less frequent, more apt to involve legal as
opposed to factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, includ-
ing public explanation." 46 Second, rulemaking decisions arise out of
denials of petitions for rulemaking that the plaintiff generally has a
right to file. 1 47 Accordingly, they are subject to judicial review, al-
though such review is "extremely limited" and "highly deferential."148
Although the four dissenting Justices did not expressly endorse
the majority's view of the reviewability of rulemaking decisions,
neither did they voice any disagreement on this score. 149 Thus, for the
moment, the Court's presumption against reviewability of inaction ap-
pears to be limited to decisions about enforcement,15 0 reconsideration
of actions,'5' employment,'152  and allocation of lump-sum
appropriations. 53
139 Brief for Federal Respondent at 36, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120),
2006 WL 3043970.
140 See Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
141 Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 139, at 37-39.
142 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 534.
145 Id. at 527.
146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 527-28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court essentially
adopted the position of the D.C. Circuit in Lyng.
149 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 535-49 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 549-69
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
150 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
151 ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987).
152 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988).
153 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993).
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In contrast to its decisions with respect to some types of agency
inaction, the Court has never suggested that agency delays as a cate-
gory are not reviewable.154 Quite the contrary, in Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court compelled agency decisionmaking-the endanger-
ment finding-that the EPA sought to defer.15 The Court held that
the Agency could not justify deferring the decision by pointing to fac-
tors unrelated to the statute that might make the endangerment find-
ing unnecessary or a low priority for the agency, such as the response
of other programs and agencies to global warming, fear that the EPA
would impair the President's ability to negotiate climate change trea-
ties with other nations, or concern on the part of the Agency that cur-
tailing motor-vehicle emissions would constitute an "inefficient,
piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue."156 The
Court held that the EPA must "ground its reasons for . . . inaction in
the statute."11 7
Moreover, in Heckler v. Day,58 the Court approved judicial rem-
edies for agency delay even though it rejected the specific remedy
chosen by the district court in the case under review. The Court held
that it was inappropriate for the district court to prescribe deadlines
for agency adjudication of social security disability claims by a class of
plaintiffs where Congress had repeatedly considered but rejected such
deadlines in amending the Social Security Act.'59 But the Court went
out of its way to make clear that the decision was "limited to the ques-
tion whether, in view of the unequivocally clear intent of Congress to
the contrary, it is nevertheless appropriate for a federal court to pre-
scribe mandatory deadlines with respect to the adjudication of disabil-
ity claims under Title II of the Act."160 The Court did not disturb the
lower courts' determination that the agency delays were "unreasona-
154 To be sure, agency delays in enforcement, employment, motions for reconsideration,
and lump-sum appropriation decisions are no more reviewable than agency failures to act in
these areas. But delays in other types of decisionmaking should be no less reviewable than the
decisions themselves.
155 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007). For this reason, Professors Dean
Revesz and Michael Livermore believe that Massachusetts v. EPA may presage stronger judicial
review of agency inaction. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 29, at 185.
156 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533-34.
157 Id. at 535.
158 Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984).
159 Id. at 110-11; see also Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. H 301-1397mm (2006). The plain-
tiffs in Day charged the Social Security Administration with unreasonable delay under the Social
Security Act, but there is no reason to think that delay claims would be less reviewable under the
APA given that the APA expressly authorizes courts to compel agency action "unreasonably
delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
160 Day, 467 U.S. at 119 n.3 3 (emphasis added).
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ble" and acknowledged that class members were entitled to resolution
of disputed benefit determinations within a "reasonable time."1 61
Thus, there is no per se bar to the reviewability of claims of unreason-
able delay by government agencies and the APA and other statutes
expressly authorize it.
C. Judicial Review of Agency Delays: The TRAC Analysis
The Supreme Court has never addressed how a court should as-
sess agency delay nor interpreted the meaning of "reasonable time"162
or "action ... unreasonably delayed" 63 as used in the APA. The most
common approach used by the lower federal courts to review delays in
both rulemaking proceedings and adjudications is the "TRAC analy-
sis," a multi-factor test that the D.C. Circuit stitched together from
prior caselaw in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.
FCC (" TRA C").164
The TRAC analysis instructs courts that
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be gov-
erned by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a
timetable or other indication of the speed with which it ex-
pects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that stat-
utory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;
(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of eco-
nomic regulation are less tolerable when human health and
welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect
of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher
or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into ac-
count the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by
delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurk-
161 Id. at 111.
162 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
163 Id. § 706(1).
164 Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
see also Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting the TRAC analysis); In re
City of Va. Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Nat'l Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA,
903 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). But see Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 191 F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (directing that, in determining reasonableness under
the APA, courts should "look to the source of delay-e.g., the complexity of the investigation as
well as the extent to which the [challenger] participated in delaying the proceeding");
Karimushan v. Chertoff, No. 07-2995, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47167, at *7 n.4 (E.D. Pa. June 13,
2008) (declining to apply the TRAC analysis but considering similar factors under Third Circuit
precedent). The Second Circuit has never elaborated on the Reddy test and it has had little
impact on the doctrine. But see Saleh v. Ridge, 367 F. Supp. 2d 508, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ac-
knowledging the Reddy test when considering whether the delay in adjudicating a plaintiff's
application for adjustment status is unreasonable).
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ing behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency ac-
tion is unreasonably delayed. 165
The D.C. Circuit describes the TRAC analysis as the "hexagonal
contours of a standard"l 66 and has never attempted to explain the rela-
tionship between the factors, their comparative importance, or if any
factors are absolutely necessary or independently sufficient for a find-
ing of unreasonable delay. Although none of the factors are offensive
in and of themselves, their meaning and the boundaries between them
are sometimes far from clear. 16 7
Take the first factor: what is a "rule of reason"? On its face it
adds little in meaning to the APA's mandate that agency actions be
completed within a "reasonable time."1 68 In MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC,169 the D.C. Circuit held that the "rule of reason" "as-
sumes that rates will be finally decided [by the FCC] within a reasona-
ble time encompassing months, occasionally a year or two, but not
several years or a decade."170 Should the same "rule of reason" apply
to other agency decisions? It does not appear so because courts rou-
tinely decline to compel agency action delayed for several years.171
But if the "rule of reason" is supplied by the applicable statutory
scheme, how does the first TRAC factor differ from the second, which
expressly instructs the court to look at whether Congress has supplied
meaning for the rule of reason?
Indeed, the second, third, and fifth TRAC factors frequently
overlap. The second factor exhorts courts to look to the statute and
legislative history for any indication of the timeline that Congress
might have had in mind.17 2 But in many cases, there is no timetable or
concern with delay expressed by Congress, in which case the second
165 Telecomnis. Research & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 80 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).
166 Id.
167 The court admitted that its approach "sometimes suffers from vagueness." Id.
168 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
169 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
170 Id. at 340. In MCI, the petitioners challenged the FCC's delay in issuing a final decision
regarding a tariff rate filed by AT&T, which under the Act remained effective until approved or
rejected by the FCC. Id. at 324.
171 See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 122, 124 (3d.
Cir. 1998) (holding that a delay of five years in regulating safety standards was not unreasona-
ble); Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2005) (delay of four years not
unreasonable); Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 885 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Nev. 1995) (declining
to compel the U.S. Department of the Interior to act on mining patent applications pending for
five years).
172 See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
ICC delays unreasonable in light of Congress's desire, evident in the text and legislative history
[Vol. 79:13811412
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factor is remarkably similar to the third, which considers the regula-
tory sphere. 73 The third and fifth factors also frequently overlap inas-
much as the regulatory sphere will shape the "nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay." 74 Put differently, delays in the imple-
mentation of human health and welfare statutes affect the health and
welfare of the individuals the statute is intended to benefit. But not-
withstanding that three TRAC factors call for swifter action where
human health and welfare are at stake, this principle is often
ignored.175
More troubling than the factors' ambiguity, however, is what is
missing. Although impropriety should not be a necessary condition
for a court to find delay unreasonable (the sixth TRAC factor), it
ought to be something close to sufficient.176 After all, if an agency's
timeline is not motivated by a desire to achieve a statutory mandate,
what possible justification could there be for further delay? The anal-
ysis thus ignores the way in which delays undermine the democratic
accountability of the administrative state.
Due to the lack of clarity in the doctrine, courts can use the
TRAC analysis to support virtually any conclusion they want to reach.
If Congress has provided a clear indication of how fast it desires the
agency to act, the courts will try to compel the agency to meet Con-
gress's expectations. But in the absence of such an indication, the en-
of the act, to "change . . . the speed with which the Commission performed its regulatory
duties").
173 For example, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), the court explained that OSHA's delay in setting standards regulating exposure to
ethylene oxide could not be justified under the OSH Act because of the Act's concern with
protecting worker's health. Id. at 1158. Similarly, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
FDA, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court concluded that if a statutory scheme's "paramount
concern is protection of the public health, the pace of agency decisionmaking must account for
this statutory concern." Id. at 34.
174 Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRA C), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
175 See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 122, 124 (holding that a delay
of more than two decades in amending safety standards, including five years since the petition
for rulemaking, was not unreasonable); In re Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 830 F.2d 369, 370
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to compel the agency to amend decades-old safety standard);
Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2000) (declining to grant mandamus
after finding that agency delays implicated health and welfare interests). Of course, agency ac-
tion is not always easily divisible between "economic regulation" and "human health and wel-
fare." Delays by the FDA in approving new drugs, for example, affect both the commercial
interests of the applicants as well as the health of consumers who stand to benefit from the
drugs.
176 Some courts have held that bad faith on the part of the agency, such as singling someone
out for bad treatment or "asserting utter indifference to a congressional deadline," may weigh
against the agency. See, e.g., In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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acting coalition drops out of the picture and the courts weigh the
individual harm caused by the delay against the burden on the agency,
with inconsistent results. The TRAC analysis makes no attempt to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate causes of delay,
rulemaking versus adjudication, specific versus broad statutory man-
dates, or decisions about priorities versus substantive action.
III. AGENCY DELAYS AND THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
Some legal scholars contend that the problem of agency inaction
and delay should be left to the political branches.177 If agency delays
are creatures of congressional delegations and represent interference
with the goals of enacting coalitions, why not rely on Congress to ad-
dress them? Alternatively, we could look to the President, who is
constitutionally obliged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,"178 to monitor and cure agency delays.
This Part argues that Congress is often ill equipped to handle
agency delays either ex ante or ex post. In addition, although the
President is in a better position to compel agency action related to
administration priorities, the President often causes delays in areas
that are either low priority or contrary to the administration's political
goals. Thus, the judiciary is frequently the only institution capable of
addressing agency delays.
A. Impediments to Congressional Control of Agency Timing
Congress sets some statutory deadlines for agency action. Profes-
sors Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O'Connell's comprehensive
review of agency rulemaking actions between 1987 and 2003 found
that approximately eight percent of all agency rulemaking actions
were associated with a statutory deadline.179 Courts will generally
compel agency action that violates a clear statutory deadline. 80 So
177 See PIERCE, supra note 8, § 12.4, at 859 ("A party who is displeased with agency delay in
a particular case is more likely to achieve success in expediting the matter through political
pressure than through judicial pressure."); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial
Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1027-36 (2000) (arguing that ac-
tion-forcing by courts disrupts agendas and contributes to the ossification of the administrative
state). Similarly, Justice Scalia contends that the standing doctrine should be limited so that the
political branches, not the courts, hear complaints "of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a
requirement or prohibition upon someone else." Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).
178 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
179 Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 24, at 941, 983 tbl.4.
180 See, e.g., In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (compelling
agency rulemaking in light of "a clear statutory mandate, a deadline nine-years ignored, and an
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why does Congress not set deadlines for the vast majority of agency
actions? We know Congress has some concern with the timeliness of
agency action because it enacts legislation against the background of
the APA's requirement that agency action be completed within a
"reasonable time."' 8' Moreover, Congress often complains about de-
lays ex post and calls for swifter agency action.182 Yet in the vast ma-
jority of cases Congress does not impose deadlines on the agencies.183
1. The Difficulty of Determining Appropriate Deadlines Ex Ante
Congress often delegates the timeline for decisionmaking to the
agencies because it does not have the time or expertise to make the
decision itself or cannot agree on how long the agencies legitimately
need.'84 Thus, as with any difficult decision on which the enacting coa-
lition cannot reach agreement, the timeline for action is ready made
for delegation to the agency.
This is particularly true ex ante when Congress passes legislation
creating a new administrative or regulatory program. It is difficult if
not impossible to know in advance how much time many decisions will
reasonably require. 85 At the very least, determining an appropriate
deadline will demand an additional level of factfinding by Congress,
which has opportunity costs.186
agency that has admitted its continuing recalcitrance"); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d
1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The agency must act by the deadline. If it withholds such timely
action, a reviewing court must compel the action unlawfully withheld. To hold otherwise would
be an affront to our tradition of legislative supremacy and constitutionally separated powers.").
But see Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 75 ("IFinding that delay is unreasonable does not, alone,
justify judicial intervention."); R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots of the Judicial Dilemma, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 585, 597 (1997) (criticizing statutory deadlines and urging courts to deny stand-
ing to enforce them).
181 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
182 See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1984) (describing repeated congressional ex-
pressions of concern regarding delays in disability claim adjudications).
183 Delays in the adjudication of disputed social security disability determinations, which
took an average of 288 days in 1975, prompted almost annual complaints by various congres-
sional subcommittees between 1975 and 1982. See id. at 111 n.16, 112. Congress considered
several bills proposing statutory deadlines and directed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to recommend "appropriate and realistic deadlines" for the resolution of disputed
claims. Id. at 115. Although the Secretary proposed such deadlines, Congress neither imposed
them nor directed the Secretary to impose them herself. See id. at 114-15 & n.26.
184 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
185 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1 7, tbl.A, Sierra Club v. John-
son, No. 01-1537(PLF) (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006) (noting an agency's failure to meet 81 out of 189
deadlines issued by Congress); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a
National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 225,
304-05 (1997) (recounting the EPA's struggle with congressional deadlines).
186 See, e.g., To Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 9560
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Consider Congress's charge that the FDA screen generic drugs
for bioequivalence to their branded counterparts-i.e., determine
whether the active ingredients of the generic drug become available at
the site of action at the same rate and extent when administered in the
same dose and under similar conditions as the brand drug.'87 In order
to determine an appropriate deadline for the FDA's screening, Con-
gress will have to grapple with the scientific subtleties of bioe-
quivalence standards and the complicated problems presented by
different categories of drugs. Assuming the necessary information
and expertise is even available, the decision will entail a significant
investment of congressional time and resources.188
In many cases, the information that Congress needs to determine
an appropriate timeline for agency decisionmaking is not available.
The Ninety-First Congress that passed the CAA in 1970 had no idea
what decisions the EPA would make thirty or forty years later. Stat-
utes such as the CAA are drafted broadly to enable an agency to ad-
dress unforeseen and changing circumstances. 189 It is impossible for
Congress to consider intelligently how much time the agency needs to
make decisions that Congress does not even know the agency will
need to make.190
Even if Congress were able to agree on an appropriate timeline in
the first instance, changes in circumstances might render the deadline
too tight or too lax. Many administrative programs were enacted long
before the advent of high-speed internet connections, e-mail, and the
use of advanced software and databases. Technological improvements
can drastically reduce the time it takes agency personnel to process
large numbers of applications for benefits, licenses, or permits. Con-
versely, unforeseen developments may render congressional deadlines
unrealistic. Thus, if the enacting coalition wishes to set a timeline that
Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. of the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 94th Cong.
140 (1975) (statement of David Zwick, Clean Water Action Project) (recognizing that setting
deadlines for water pollution control in municipalities would require additional information);
Stewart, supra note 34, at 1695 ("Such a task would require resources that Congress has, in most
instances, been unable or unwilling to muster.").
187 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, REVIEW OF
BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES WITH CLINICAL ENDPOINTS IN ANDAs 2 (2006), available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDERIManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm07
9585.pdf.
188 See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 2, at 115.
189 Both the SDWA and the CAA, for example, mandate that the EPA set regulatory stan-
dards for pollutants as they become known and revise those standards as the science evolves.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-300g-1 (2006); id. § 7408.
190 See Samoff, supra note 185, at 304-05.
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will stand the test of time, it will need to allow for flexibility based on
changing circumstances and the particular issues that the agency must
address. But of course this is exactly what Congress has done with the
APA, which mandates that agencies decide matters within a "reasona-
ble time" and authorizes courts to compel agency action "unreasona-
bly delayed."191
To be sure, setting deadlines need not always be about factfind-
ing-i.e., determining the time that an agency needs to make a deci-
sion. Deadlines can also shape the agency's decisionmaking process
by signaling to the agency that a matter is a high priority or that time
is of the essence. Congress frequently sets deadlines for administra-
tive processes, such as the adjudication of benefits, in which the
agency is making large numbers of decisions about applicants' eligibil-
ity using the same criteria.192 Such deadlines may signify a determina-
tion by Congress about how the agency should balance the timeliness
and quality of its decisions.19 3 There are political and structural im-
pediments, however, to reaching legislative consensus on the timing of
agency action.
2. Political Impediments to Congressional Action
There can be significant political costs to setting statutory dead-
lines. Because deadlines effectively strengthen legislation, members
of Congress will oppose them wherever there are political costs for
supporting more stringent regulation. A constituency concerned
about the effect of environmental regulations on local industry, for
example, may accept vaguely worded statutes promoting "clean air,"
but object to deadlines for regulating pollutants emitted by factories
that employ local residents. Thus, statutory deadlines need strong ad-
vocates in Congress.
Few delays in and of themselves directly affect a sufficient num-
ber of sufficiently powerful constituents to guarantee congressional at-
tention. Each delay in adjudicating an application for benefits, a
license, or a permit directly impacts only the individual applicant.194
191 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (2006).
192 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006) (deadlines for adjudication of naturalization applica-
tions); 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(2) (2006) (deadlines for adjudication of food additive petitions); 42
U.S.C. § 405(q)(2) (deadlines for Social Security payments).
193 See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104. 113-15 (1984) (noting Congress's "concern that
mandatory deadlines would jeopardize the quality and uniformity of agency decisions") Pierce,
supra note 32, at 1271 ("[Ilmposition of decisional deadlines always involves balancing the com-
peting goals of timeliness, accuracy, and consistency.").
194 There may also be indirect costs to other parties, such as consumers unable to obtain
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In addition, administrative screening programs rarely affect all appli-
cants in the same way. Some applications speed through the process,
while others linger. Delays in standard setting may also affect in-
tended beneficiaries differently depending on where they live, work,
and play. Thus, those most directly harmed by agency delays are
often like Tolstoy's unhappy families-each is unhappy in its own
way-making it difficult to lobby Congress effectively.
Many parties affected by delays are poor, diffuse, or politically
disadvantaged in the halls of Congress. Applicants for disability or
immigration benefits are unlikely to have the resources for a vigorous
lobbying campaign, and the organizations that advocate on their be-
half struggle to find the resources to focus congressional attention on
their substantive program needs. Similarly, the beneficiaries of con-
sumer and environmental regulations are diffuse and, despite impres-
sive efforts by advocacy organizations such as Public Citizen and the
National Resources Defense Council, are often outgunned by the in-
dustries that oppose regulatory action. 195 Although individual mem-
bers of Congress frequently write to agencies on their constituents'
behalf,196 only when delays begin to affect large numbers of intended
beneficiaries of politically popular programs will Congress begin to
hold hearings and consider imposing statutory deadlines.197
Even when members of Congress wish to cure agency delays, leg-
islative action risks reopening dormant policy disputes and causing un-
intended consequences. An attempt to tighten the deadline for
adjudication of naturalization applications may provoke efforts to re-
duce the number of immigrants permitted to enter the country.
Finally, it will be particularly difficult for Congress to cure delays
that serve the President's policy preferences, given the supermajority
requirements of overriding a presidential veto. Accordingly, there are
serious political impediments to curing agency delays with new
legislation.
3. The Costs of Ex Post Monitoring, Rewards, and Sanctions
Positive political theorists have long noted that congressional
control of the bureaucracy by means of monitoring, rewards, and sanc-
new drugs because of FDA delays in premarketing approval. If the indirect costs of delays are
significant to a politically mobilized group, as was the case with FDA delays in approving HIV/
AIDS treatments in the 1990s, Congress is more likely to act.
195 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 162 (2009).
196 See McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 290.
197 See Day, 467 U.S. at 112-15 & nn.16, 18, & 26; PIERCE, supra note 8, § 12.4, at 860.
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tions is costly and imperfect.' 98 These activities impose significant op-
portunity costs on Congress because the time devoted to acquiring
information, evaluating potential noncompliance, and deciding on
sanctions could be spent providing new legislative benefits to constitu-
ents.199 Furthermore, there may be significant gaps in Congress's un-
derstanding of agency action because monitoring ultimately depends
on the information agencies supply.200
Finally, for monitoring to be effective, the potential sanctions that
the agency risks incurring from delay must be credible. Although con-
gressional hearings can be embarrassing to agency personnel that
must defend the agency, their record of accelerating action is mixed.201
Congress's most effective tool for controlling the bureaucracy is the
power of the purse, but cutting the budget of an agency is likely only
to exacerbate the problem of delay. Although additional funding
sometimes helps, it is hardly an effective sanction and might even en-
courage inaction as justification for additional appropriations. Statu-
tory deadlines are a stronger sanction, because they restrict the
agency's discretion, but they may not be a credible threat because of
how difficult they are to enact ex post.
4. Structural Impediments to Curing Agency Delay Ex Post
It is exceedingly difficult for Congress to pass new legislation
even when a majority of the voters favor legislative action. It requires
the coordination of multiple committees, both houses of Congress
(possibly a supermajority in the Senate), and in most cases, the Presi-
dent. Positive political theorists studying congressional control of the
bureaucracy have observed that the difficulty is compounded when
Congress seeks to pass legislation to correct "agency drift"-i.e., de-
partures, within certain defined parameters, from the enacting coali-
tion's policy preferences. 202 Because legislative outcomes are highly
dependent on the status quo that the legislation seeks to alter, the
enacting coalition may not be able to regroup to correct agency drift
198 Committee and subcommittee oversight and constituent services accounted for more
than half of congressional staff time in the 1970s, MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF
THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 58 (1977), and the number of congressional staff working on
constituent services tripled between 1972 and 1990, Larry Liebert, Hill's Growth Industry: Con-
stituent Service, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1758 (1994). There is no reason to think the time spent
on constituent services has declined since then.
199 McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 250.
200 Id. at 251.
201 See supra note 183.
202 McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 250-51; McCubbins, et
al., Structure and Process, supra note 32, at 435-40.
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after the enacting legislation and the agency's response has changed
the status quo.
Consider a hypothetical piece of environmental legislation that
imposes certain costs on industry to reduce pollution. The Senate and
the House have different preferences as to how stringent the legisla-
tion should be. The House would like environmental legislation that
rates about seven on a scale of one to ten, where one represents the
least stringent regulation and ten represents the most stringent; the
Senate would like regulation that rates only about four. Current regu-
lation is rated two and the two houses settle on regulation that rates
five because it is closer to each house's policy preferences than the
status quo of two. If the agency now promulgates regulation that rates
three and the policy preferences of each house remain unchanged, it
will be difficult for the enacting coalition to correct the agency drift
because the new status quo of three is equally desirable to the Senate
as the enacted legislation's goal of five. Similarly, if the agency regu-
lates in a range of six to eight, the House will have no interest in cor-
recting the agency. Thus, the agency can regulate in a range of three
to eight with little fear of a legislative response. 20 3
Although the range of congressional preferences and agency re-
sponses is generally much more complicated than the foregoing styl-
ized model, the model explains the difficulty that Congress has in
curing agency delays. Because delays in the implementation of legis-
lation dilute the force of the statute, unless the enacting coalition has
homogeneous policy preferences (an exceedingly unlikely scenario),
some members of the coalition will have no interest in changing the
status quo by stopping the agency's foot-dragging. Consequently,
Congress will not be able to enact new legislation unless and until the
agency's recalcitrance becomes extreme. 204
Consider the history of the 1970 amendments to the CAA, in
which Congress directed the EPA to set standards for stationary and
mobile sources of hazardous air pollutants. 20 5 Congress instructed the
203 See McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 248 (noting that
congressional responses to agency action are generally adopted only if there is "some blunder or
radical departure" from Congress's intended policy).
204 The complexities posed by the fragmented authority of the political branches under our
constitutional system only compounds colective action problems. Id. Even a relatively cohesive
coalition constituting a simple majority will be powerless to act without the President's acquies-
cence or in some cases the willingness of a few Senators or Representatives to vote a bill out of
committee.
205 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006)). The history of EPA delays in regulating under
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EPA to publish a list of pollutants it intended to regulate and periodi-
cally review the list to add new pollutants as necessary.206 Over the
next eighteen years, the EPA listed only eight pollutants and promul-
gated regulations for only some sources of seven hazardous air pollu-
tants.207 It took Congress until 1990 to respond with legislation
declaring one hundred eighty-nine new "hazardous pollutants" and
setting deadlines for the EPA to issue standards for them over the
next ten years. 208
Congress encountered similar problems with the EPA under the
Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"). 2 09 Twelve years after the Act's
passage, the EPA had established standards for only a "small fraction"
of the contaminants found in the public water system that posed po-
tential health risks.2 10 Congress finally acted in 1986, amending the
SDWA and establishing schedules and deadlines for standard setting,
including a list of eighty-three contaminants to regulate within three
years.2 11
In sum, it is exceedingly difficult for Congress to cure agency de-
lays either ex ante or ex post. Although Congress may be in a better
position ex post to determine an appropriate deadline for action or an
alternative legislative fix, it is politically and structurally difficult for
Congress to act unless and until delays become extreme, directly af-
fect significant numbers of constituents in similar ways, or harm a po-
the CAA and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. H§ 300f-300j-25), and Congress's response is discussed in Nicholas
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUm. L. REV.
1260, 1275 (2006).
206 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 112(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b)).
207 S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 111 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3513.
208 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2398, 2532-2535,
2537-2539 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1), (c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(5), (c)(6), (e)(1)). Congress
provided tiered deadlines along with guidance on how to prioritize among the 189 new pollu-
tants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1), (2). Nevertheless, when the ten-year deadline expired, the EPA
still had not promulgated standards for 81 pollutants on the list. Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 185, at $ 7, tbl.A. The Sierra Club subsequently filed suit and in
2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the EPA to promulgate stan-
dards for the remaining pollutants by 2009. Sierra Club v. Johnson, No. 01-1537(PLF), 2006 WL
889801, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006). amended in part by 2011 WL 181097 (D.D.C. Jan. 20,
2011).
209 Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25).
210 S. Rep. No. 99-56, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
211 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat 642 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(2)(A)). As noted above, the problem returned during
the last administration. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
2011] 1421
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1421 2010-2011
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
litically powerful constituency. Consequently, it should not be
surprising that Congress rarely sets statutory deadlines212 or enacts
other legislative cures for agency delays. 2 13
B. The Executive Branch and Agency Delays
The President sits at the apex of the administrative state and is
constitutionally obliged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."2 14 With his ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the bu-
reaucracy functions properly, why not rely on the President to cure
agency delays? The President possesses significant tools to control the
administrative state. But the President's power over the bureaucracy
is a double-edged sword. The President competes with enacting coali-
tions as a principal seeking control over agency agendas. Conse-
quently, when the President's policy preferences diverge from those of
the enacting coalition, the President can be another source of delay.
1. Informal Presidential Control of the Administrative State
The President appoints the heads of the executive departments,
most executive branch agencies, many of the independent agencies
and regulatory commissions, and more than two thousand other se-
nior noncareer positions in the executive branch. 215 Most of these ad-
ministrators serve at the pleasure of the President and are likely to
share the President's political ideology and policy goals. 2 16 They over-
212 Professors Gersen and O'Connell found that although most agencies faced few statu-
tory deadlines during the period under review, a handful of agencies faced more than 100 dead-
lines, including the EPA (611), Department of Commerce (940), Department of Interior (279),
Department of Transportation (350), Department of Agriculture (350), and Department of
Health and Human Services (323). Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 24, at 939, 981 tbl.2. Profes-
sors Gersen and O'Connell do not speculate on why these agencies faced the brunt of congres-
sional action, but they do conclude from the data that deadlines are more frequently associated
with "significant regulatory actions" than with more mundane agency decisions and that Con-
gress uses deadlines to constrain agency actions that may affect powerfully situated political
interests. Id. at 941-42.
213 Congress can also amend statutes to eliminate procedural bottlenecks or alleviate the
costs of the delays, as Congress did when it provided interim relief while disability beneficiaries
challenged the termination of their benefits. See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 127 n.8 (1984)
(citing Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 2, 96 Stat. 298, (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(g))). But passing such legislation entails the same political and status quo chal-
lenges as correcting other forms of agency drift.
214 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
215 James P. Pfiffner, Recruiting Executive Branch Leaders: The Office of Presidential Per-
sonnel, BROOKINGS (Spring 2001), http://www.brookings.edularticles/2001/spring-governance
pfiffner.aspx.
216 David B. Spence, Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Del-
egation Problem, 7 J. Pus. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 199, 211 (1997). When Comptroller of the
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see the day-to-day operations of the agencies and are in the best posi-
tion to compel agency action. Thus, the White House has significant
informal influence over both the substance and pace of agency deci-
sionmaking by virtue of senior agency managers.217
But there are limits to the ability of agency heads to cure delays,
particularly in areas that are not White House priorities. Presidential
appointees serve for only about two years on average. 218 This is not
much time to hasten the pace of decisionmaking. Moreover, unless
the agency manager is appointed with a mandate to eliminate certain
delays, dealing with those delays is unlikely to be a priority during
such a short tenure. In addition, the high turnover of administrators
can make it difficult for the President to exert consistent and continu-
ous influence over the agencies. As the White House identifies, vets,
nominates, and waits for Senate confirmation of a new appointee, the
President's control over the agency will wane, particularly if civil ser-
vice employees who do not share the President's priorities manage the
agency in the interim.
2. Formal Presidential Control of the Administrative State
The President's formal control over the administrative state has
increased substantially in the last three decades as a series of Execu-
tive orders have centralized review of the regulatory initiatives of ex-
ecutive branch agencies in the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA") within the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB").219 Upon taking office, President Reagan issued Executive
Order 12,291, requiring agencies to assess the net costs and benefits of
all major regulations, set regulatory priorities with the aim of maxi-
mizing the aggregate net benefits to society, and provide OIRA with a
regulatory impact analysis for all major regulations.220 Then, on the
Treasury Robert W. Tayler reportedly told President Ulysses S. Grant that he could not change a
ruling with which the President disagreed, President Grant asked: "If you can't change your
decision, I can change Controllers, can't I?" Nixon Plummer, Another Effort to Rid Uncle Sam
of Red Tape, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1925, at X4.
217 The President's control over an agency head may be weaker if the President must ap-
point someone with particular technical or managerial skills. See C. Frederick Beckner, III, The
FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 541-42 (1993) (noting that FDA commissioners have
consistently been strong advocates of drug regulation despite the different political ideologies of
their presidents).
218 Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REv. 913, 919 n.23 (2009).
219 The OMB does not review the actions of independent regulatory agencies.
220 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked
by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). For a
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eve of his second term, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,498, requiring agencies to submit annual regulatory plans to OIRA
with their proposed actions for the coming year.2 2 1 Although Presi-
dent Clinton formally repealed both orders in 1993 with Executive
Order 12,866, he maintained OIRA's centralized oversight of regula-
tory action and many of the substantive principles of review. 222 Like-
wise, President Obama has maintained strong White House oversight
of agency action, although he has modified some of its features.223
Thus, through the OIRA review process, the President has a powerful
tool for identifying and addressing unreasonable delays in agency
actions.
However, as Professors Nicholas Bagley and Dean Richard
Revesz have explained, many of the features of OIRA review create
an institutional bias against regulation due to the Reagan-era concerns
with overregulation. 224 The review is almost wholly reactive and sys-
tematically fails to examine agency inaction. 225 With just twenty-two
employees reviewing six hundred economically significant regulations
per year, OIRA has more on its plate than it can handle.226 Although
OIRA has issued fourteen so-called prompt letters since 2001,227 only
five of those arguably urged an agency to act more quickly on a matter
as opposed to suggesting ways to improve the quality of decisionmak-
ing.2 2 8 This is but a drop in the bucket when compared to the numer-
ous agency delays during the period.
discussion of these Executive Orders and their contribution to Executive control of the adminis-
trative state, see Bagley & Revesz, supra note 205, at 1263-64, and Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
221 Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked
by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5. U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 205, at 1264; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 220, at 3.
222 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006);
see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 205, at 1266-67; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 220, at 6.
223 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
224 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 205, at 1280-82.
225 Id. at 1274-78.
226 Id. at 1277-78.
227 Prompt letters are sent to agencies on the OMB's initiative and suggest (1) issues that
the "OMB believes [are] worthy of agency priority" or (2) "how the agency could improve its
regulations." OIRA Prompt Letters, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.govlpublicljspl
EO/promptLetters.jsp (last visited May 27, 2011).
228 See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, OIRA, to Armando Falcon, Jr., Dir., Office of
Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight (May 29, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/
prompt-ofheo052902.html; Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, OIRA, and James L. Con-
naughton, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Benjamin Grumbles, Acting Assistant
Adm'r, Office of Water, EPA (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/
epa-beach-act-2000.pdf; Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, OIRA, to the Honorable John
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Finally, OIRA's review process itself causes delay.2 2 9 Indeed,
OIRA was originally designed as a bureaucratic cover for slowing
down the pace of the administrative state.230 President Obama has
sought recommendations on reforming the process to prevent undue
delays caused by OIRA but has yet to implement any significant re-
forms in this regard.231
As a centralized mechanism for reviewing agency priorities and
the progress of agency action, OIRA has the potential to be a power-
ful tool for curing delays, as discussed below in Part IV.B. But the
promise has yet to be realized, and, to date, Presidents have not
shown any enthusiasm for using OIRA in this way.
3. Presidential Priorities
Although the President benefits from centralized review of regu-
latory initiatives, the President can also communicate administration
priorities directly to the agencies through the agency heads and does
not need OIRA as a middleman. 232 Consider how President Obama
quickly and publicly directed the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to craft rules prohibiting the denial of insurance to children with
preexisting conditions when insurance companies suggested that the
new healthcare law did not in fact include such a prohibition until
2014.233
Moreover, the White House does not want OIRA prompting ac-
tion in areas where the President opposes regulation or that will divert
Henshaw, Assistant Sec'y of Labor, OSHA (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/prompt/osha-prompt_1etter.html; Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, OIRA, to the
Honorable Michael P. Jaccobson, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't of Transp. (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/nhsta-promptl2070l.html; Letter from John D. Graham,
Adm'r, OIRA, to the Honorable Tommy Thompson, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18,
2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs-prompt_1etter.html.
229 In 2007, OIRA review delayed the publication of Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRMs") 70.6 days on average, ranging from 6 days to 292 days. See Letter from Jacob Ger-
sen & Anne Joseph O'Connell to Jessica Hertz, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Feb. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/Anne JosephOConnell.pdf.
230 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 205, at 1267-68.
231 See supra notes 17-18.
232 The EPA, for example, began moving forward with new efforts under the CAA almost
immediately following President Obama's inauguration. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Green-
house Gas Regulations; Reconsideration of Previous Denial of a Waiver of Preemption, 74 Fed.
Reg. 7,040-02 (Feb. 12, 2009).
233 Robert Pear, Coverage Now for Sick Children? Check Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2010, at A13.
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resources and attention from the President's priorities. The President
has constituencies to please just like any politician and has little inter-
est in prompting agency action across the board. Consequently, the
President is often part.of the problem when it comes to agency delays.
The President may be able to focus agencies on his administration's
priorities, but at best this will do nothing to accelerate action on low
priorities and at worst it will exacerbate delays in other areas.234 Thus,
whether by intention or inattention, the President contributes to
agency delays, notwithstanding the President's ability to prompt
agency action on administration priorities.
Some scholars and commentators, including the newest Justice on
the Supreme Court, have applauded the expansion of executive con-
trol over the administrative state, arguing that because the President
answers to a national constituency, presidential control provides dem-
ocratic accountability for agency discretion. 235 But the President's
election hardly makes unreasonable delay caused by the President's
opposition to legislative goals more constitutionally legitimate than
delay caused by agency staff, a regulated industry, public interest
groups, or individual members of Congress. The President is at most
one member of the enacting coalition that charges the administrative
state with its responsibilities, and if the enacting coalition has overrid-
den a presidential veto, not even that. Whatever one thinks of presi-
dential control over agency policy discretion, 236 the President should
not have the power by means of delay to block legislation signed by
prior Presidents, passed over a formal veto, or even enacted with the
President's own signature.
234 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 157 (3d Cir. 2002)
(describing how the Clinton Administration's focus on a particular set of regulations led OSHA
to delay rulemaking in other areas).
235 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 60, at 2252 (arguing that presidential influence on adminis-
trative regulation "renders the bureaucratic sphere more transparent and responsive to the
public").
236 This Article does not stake out a position in the debate regarding the scope of presiden-
tial control over the substantive policymaking discretion granted to agencies by Congress. To be
sure, when Congress does not provide a specific deadline for agency action, the APA or the
enabling statute grants the agency some discretion over timing. But regardless of who exercises
that discretion-the agency or the White House-courts must judge when the discretion has
been abused.
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C. Comparative Institutional Capacities, Competencies, and
Remedies of the Three Branches in Curing
Agency Delays
Even if one accepts that the political branches cannot be relied
upon to cure agency delays, this does not necessarily mean that the
judiciary can do any better. This Section compares the factfinding
competencies of the three branches, their capacities to take corrective
action, and the remedies available to each.
1. Identifying Causes of Delay and Assessing
Their Reasonableness
Due to the timing of legal challenges to agency delays, courts do
not confront the same difficulties as enacting coalitions in determining
ex ante an appropriate deadline for decisionmaking. Unlike the en-
acting coalition, the court will have a factual record developed
through civil discovery from which to understand the demands and
challenges that the agency faces, so the court need not speculate about
the considerations involved in determining an appropriate timeline.
In addition, courts are at least as competent as Congress to deter-
mine the cause of agency delays ex post, if not more competent. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide litigants with powerful fact-
finding tools to root out the sources of delay.2 37 Although congres-
sional committees can call agency personnel to testify under oath and
subpoena documents, much of what goes on in hearings is political
posturing rather than serious factual examination. Moreover, the
party challenging delay will typically have a stronger motivation to
develop a record to support its claim than the congressional commit-
tee overseeing the agency, which merely has to look tough for constit-
uents. Indeed, judicial review can assist congressional monitoring of
the administrative state by uncovering delays caused by a competing
principal attempting to thwart the enacting coalition's legislative
goals.
The White House, by virtue of the President's informal and for-
mal controls over the administrative state,238 should have superior ac-
cess to information and expertise relevant to agency delays than either
Congress or the courts. But agencies can shape the flow of informa-
tion to the White House, and unless and until the delays affect admin-
237 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (providing a variety of discovery methods, and pro-
cedures to enforce those methods).
238 See supra Part III.B.
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istration priorities, the White House is unlikely to push hard to
determine the causes of delay.
Nevertheless, judicial factfinding is narrow in the sense that it fo-
cuses on discrete problems rather than developing a complete picture
of an agency's agenda.239 Agencies frequently complain that they do
not have enough resources to act any faster.240 It is generally the
agency's choice of priorities, rather than resource constraints per se,
that cause delays, inasmuch as agencies allocate finite resources ac-
cording to their priorities, unless Congress has tied funding to specific
activities. But it is difficult for a court to know (1) whether the agency
actually has too many matters on its plate or (2) whether the agency is
making rational decisions about its priorities. Plaintiffs challenging
one delayed matter have no incentive to develop a record concerning
other responsibilities of the agency. The parties who benefit from
other agency activities will likely not be in court, and a more holistic
judicial review would quickly become unworkable. 2 4 1
Consequently, courts are extremely receptive to arguments that
compelling agency action in one matter will interfere with other
agency priorities.242 Congress generally grants agencies wide discre-
tion in allocating their resources and agency allocations of funds from
lump sum appropriations are not subject to judicial review. 24 3 Courts
are loath to indirectly force the reallocation of resources by shuffling
the agency's priorities, fearing that accelerating decisionmaking in one
area will merely force the agency to pull resources from another. 244
239 See Cross, supra note 177, at 1029-30.
240 See, e.g., Pub. Citizens Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 157 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that OSHA attempted to justify its delay by pointing out that it was pressured to use its
limited resources on other regulations).
241 See Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 259-60 ("[Ilt is impossible to identify, much less com-
pletely understand, every possible policy choice open to an agency.").
242 See, e.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRA C), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). But see Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the lack of congressional funding does not relieve an agency of nondiscretionary duty, but
may constitute an impossibility defense in a contempt proceeding if the agency fails to meet a
court-imposed deadline).
243 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) ("The allocation of funds from a lump-sum
is ... traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion."). On the other hand, appropria-
tions statutes are construed narrowly because legislative deliberation is unlikely and interest
group power is strong. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RiGrrs REVOLUTION: RECONCEIV-
ING THE REGULATORY STATE 169 (1993).
244 See, e.g., Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100-01
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying injunctive relief against an agency that would have the effect of al-
lowing the plaintiffs to cut ahead of others who had been waiting just as long); In re Barr Labs.,
930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("In short, we have no basis for reordering agency priorities.");
TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 ("[Tihe court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on
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Both courts and scholars are concerned that compelling action
thereby allows private litigants, rather than the agency or the political
branches, to set the agency's agenda. 24 5
Some of the concerns with compelling action are overstated or
not unique to judicial review of agency delay. First, judicial review of
agency action can also significantly impact an agency's agenda. A
court order invalidating a final rule forces the reallocation of re-
sources by placing a matter back on the agency's agenda. Compelling
agencies to complete decisionmaking expeditiously rather than contin-
uing to gather and process information can help agencies conserve re-
sources, so long as it does not lead to a decision that fails judicial
review. Moreover, prolonged decisionmaking is inefficient. Over
time, agency employees depart, new personnel must be trained and
briefed on old matters, and previous findings must be revisited.
Second, there is nothing antidemocratic about private parties
harmed by delays forcing agencies to pursue legislative goals; the pri-
vate litigant is simply compelling the agency to fulfill a statutory duty
via the judiciary. Because resource constraints are ubiquitous, if they
were an adequate justification for delay agencies would have no
trouble thwarting the goals of the enacting coalition based on diver-
gent policy preferences. Moreover, Congress frequently relies on ju-
dicial review, initiated by private litigants, to prevent and check
agency drift.24 6 Finally, it is somewhat disingenuous as a purely formal
matter to pronounce delays in one area "reasonable" merely because
the agency is working on other priorities.
Nevertheless, from a principal-agent perspective, courts should
hesitate to interfere with competing legislative goals of either the
same or another enacting coalition. Although courts cannot dictate
the substance of the decisions they compel, compelling action still
risks substituting the court's priorities for that of the political
branches.247
agency activities of a higher or competing priority."); Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d
30, 40 (D.D.C. 2000) ("If, for example, compelling agency action will serve only to delay other
important [agency] matters, the delay in question may be considered reasonable.").
245 See Cross, supra note 177, at 1028-29; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (1982); cf Biber, Resource Alloca-
tion, supra note 20, at 18 (discussing the importance of maintaining agency independence in
agenda-setting vis-A-vis Congress and the judiciary).
246 McCubbins, et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 32, at 271-73.
247 See Pierce, supra note 32, at 1261 ("[A] decision to defer implementation of one policy
is invariably a decision to implement immediately a competing policy.").
20111 1429
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1429 2010-2011
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Thus, although courts are well equipped to determine the causes
of specific delays and evaluate their legitimacy under their respective
enabling statute, courts are less well equipped to understand a mat-
ter's relative importance within the full panoply of an agency's
agenda. Because Congress and the President are responsible for su-
pervising the entirety of an agency's agenda, at least in theory they
should be in a better position to judge the relative importance of vari-
ous responsibilities within an agency's broad statutory mandate or
under different statutes.
2. Capacity to Take Corrective Action
The judiciary is not known for its expeditious decisionmaking
and, like the administrative state, is frequently the subject of com-
plaints about delay. 24 8 Thus, a decision to go to court to compel
agency action is unlikely to be a fast track to a remedy, particularly
when compared to the President's ability to compel agency action re-
lated to administration priorities.
Still, if the agency's inaction is reviewable,249 the judiciary does
not face the same political or structural constraints on curing agency
delays ex post as the political branches. The fact that a delay affects
only a discrete and insular minority or a set of diffuse and poorly or-
ganized beneficiaries will not impede judicial review. Indeed, it is
generally recognized that courts have an important role to play in pro-
tecting such groups from the prejudice or indifference of majoritarian
politics. 250
Nor do courts face the same status quo impediments to corrective
action as does Congress when confronting agency drift.25 1 Indeed,
courts are generally more comfortable ordering incremental rather
than wholesale changes in agency activities.
Finally, judicial review of agency delays does not entail the same
lost opportunity costs as monitoring by the political branches, which
248 In 2008, 5469 civil cases in the Second Circuit had been pending for over three years,
constituting 14.7% of all the 37,180 cases pending in 2008. STATISTICAL Div. OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORTS 17 tbl.14 (2008), available at http://www.
ca2.uscourts.govfReports/08/Statistics.pdf.
249 See supra Part II.
250 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (O'Connor, J.)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing the judiciary's role under the Equal Protection Clause to protect
"'discrete and insular minorities' from majoritarian prejudice or indifference" (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (same).
251 See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
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diverts attention from prospective legislation. A core responsibility of
the judiciary is to ensure that agencies act according to their statutory
responsibilities and compelling action protects judicial review of agen-
cies' substantive decisions.
Thus, although the President in many cases can obtain expedi-
tious relief, those without White House access must look to Congress
or the courts. As between the two, unless delays affect a politically
powerful group or a large number of individuals in similar ways, the
courts are often in a better position than Congress to act.
3. Fashioning Remedies
Courts have fewer remedies available than Congress to address
delays, which is a serious disadvantage of relying upon judicial review.
Congress can provide agencies with additional resources for staff, in-
frastructure, technology, or other improvements that can alleviate
sources of delay. Similarly, Congress can alter administrative or regu-
latory processes to remove a procedural bottleneck or lessen the harm
caused by delays. 252 The judiciary cannot offer the agency any of these
remedies. Courts can only remove statutorily inappropriate causes of
delay and perhaps motivate agencies to operate more expeditiously
with the threat of contempt.
Still, judicial responses to agency delays are more flexible than
their legislative counterparts. Court orders can be amended in a
changing environment, whereas it is difficult and time consuming to
amend enacted legislation. 25 3 The court can tailor its order to specific
regulatory matters, particular offices, geographic regions, or discrete
time periods in a way that is difficult for Congress to do.254
In addition, the sanctions available to courts may in some cases
be more credible than congressional action. To be sure, Congress is
capable of much more severe sanctions, such as eliminating or reorga-
nizing the agency, increasing the agency's workload, decreasing its
funding, or passing other punitive measures. But for the reasons dis-
cussed above in Part III.A, it is exceedingly unlikely in most cases that
Congress will impose such sanctions. Moreover, the agency will be
forewarned if Congress is considering such action and can lobby
against it. Whereas credible congressional sanctions require the atten-
252 See, e.g., supra note 213.
253 See supra Part III.A.4.
254 See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 120 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (praising the dis-
trict court for ordering a "meaningful, carefully-tailored statewide remedy" rather than "intrud-
ing clumsily into a pervasively regulated area").
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tion of both houses of Congress (and in most cases, the President), a
single judge and a few law clerks can address an agency delay, and the
minds of judges are notoriously difficult to read. Although a judicial
order of contempt may not seem particularly threatening, in fact
Professors Gersen and O'Connell have found that judicially imposed
deadlines on average are somewhat more effective than statutory
deadlines at compelling agency action.255
Finally, court sanctions can serve an important signaling function
to Congress that agency delays have become unreasonable. Intended
beneficiaries and their congressional allies can leverage the court's de-
termination in pushing for legislative action.
In sum, the President is probably in the best position to cure
agency delays related to the administration's priorities or favored con-
stituencies. But the President has little incentive to address delays in
other areas and often contributes to them. Congress has the most
powerful tools to cure agency delays, but faces serious political and
structural impediments to corrective action. Thus, the judiciary is
sometimes the only branch in a position to take corrective action.
Courts are competent to identify the causes of delays, assess their le-
gitimacy, remove statutorily inappropriate sources of delay, and fash-
ion flexible responses to changing conditions. But courts are less
competent to evaluate the relative importance of a matter to an
agency's overall agenda and may not have the powerful remedies nec-
essary to cure some delays.
IV. REFORMING POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY DELAYS
As the discussion in Part III.C demonstrates, no single branch of
government has all the institutional competencies, capacities, or reme-
dies to cure agency delays on its own. A coordinated effort is re-
quired. This Part proposes several reforms to assist the political
branches and the judiciary to work together to identify and correct
delays that threaten legislative mandates. Part IV.A begins with Con-
gress, which is the source of many of the challenges in curing agency
delays. Part IV.B turns to the executive branch and OIRA. Finally,
Part IV.C proposes a new framework for judicial review of agency
delays that addresses them as a principal-agent problem.
255 Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 24, at 949 & n.84.
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A. Congressional Guidance
As discussed in Part I.A, it is Congress's lack of specificity in del-
egating that creates opportunities for delay and makes it difficult for
courts to judge the delay's reasonableness. There are good reasons
why Congress cannot and in many cases, should not, set hard-and-fast
deadlines, 256 but enacting coalitions can provide more guidance to
agencies and courts concerning their sense of the appropriate timeline
for agency action. For example, in the context of immigration bene-
fits, Congress expressed its view that naturalization applications
should be adjudicated within six months. 257 Although this is not a
hard-and-fast deadline to be sure, it might serve as a presumptive
timeline for agency adjudication. If large numbers of applications are
being adjudicated outside this timeframe, the courts should ask the
agency to justify the costs of the procedures causing the delays.
Such direction should be easier for enacting coalitions to pass
than statutory deadlines. In addition, general guidelines are less prob-
lematic if the timeline turns out to be unrealistic. Unlike statutory
deadlines, courts can easily excuse the presumption if warranted by
circumstances.
In addition, enacting coalitions should provide agencies with
more guidance on how to set their priorities to accomplish the ena-
bling statute's legislative goals. Agency delays in the regulatory con-
text are, in part, creatures of broad delegations of authority that fail to
explain how agencies should prioritize the many responsibilities with
which they are tasked. Although there is no reason to think that Con-
gress will stop delegating decisions to agencies anytime soon, it can at
least express the second-order values that agencies should consider in
setting their agendas.
B. Utilizing the OIRA Review Process to Address Agency Delays
The OIRA review process has promise as a tool for both courts
and Congress to address agency delays. 258 Each year, agencies submit
their regulatory agendas to OIRA and indicate the stage in the
rulemaking process-e.g., Prerule, Proposed Rule, Final Rule, or
256 See supra Part III.A.
257 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2006).
258 See, e.g., REVESZ AND LIVERMORE, supra note 29, at 171-83 (urging a change in OIRA
focus from checking agencies toward agenda-setting and calibration of regulatory stringency,
interagency coordination, and distributional analysis).
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Long-Term Action-of each regulatory matter.2 5 9 The agencies also
include timetables for action.26 0 OIRA submissions thus provide a
useful snapshot of an agency's agenda and its priorities.
Two reforms, each of which could be implemented through an
Executive order, would strengthen the OIRA review process as a tool
for both the courts and the political branches to evaluate and address
agency delays. First, agencies should indicate with respect to each
matter in their OIRA submissions whether they are in the process of
(1) determining if a matter is a priority, or (2) crafting a substantive
regulatory response. Second, agencies should indicate those matters
that they are not actively pursuing, or pursuing more expeditiously,
because they deem them to be low priorities in light of resource
constraints. 261
These reforms would have several benefits. When plaintiffs chal-
lenge a delayed action, the agency often points to several other mat-
ters on its agenda and claims these competing priorities are absorbing
its time and attention. 262 It is difficult for Congress or the courts to
know whether to credit the agency's claims or whether they are
merely a litigation position.263  An agency's OIRA submissions are
more credible than the papers its lawyers file in litigation. Courts
would no longer have to second-guess the agency's purported priori-
ties, as they currently must do under the TRAC analysis.264
Moreover, unless a significant number of regulatory matters are
similarly stalled, Congress is unlikely to overcome political and struc-
tural impediments to addressing delays through legislative action for
259 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
260 Id.
261 Granting agencies greater deference for matters that are not on their active agenda
would encourage agencies to make these distinctions. Cf Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2172-74 (2009) (suggesting that
greater judicial deference for agency preemption statements promulgated through notice and
comment procedures encourages agencies to use those procedures).
262 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).
263 Indeed, it is often difficult to know whether the agency has even begun working on a
matter. "The first public notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register might be preceded by
weeks, months, or even years of work." Kerwin, supra note 2, at 107. In some cases, the agency
classifies matters at the Prerule Stage although it has initiated review under the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 609(b)(2)-(3), (d) (requiring the EPA and
OSHA to convene panels to consult with small entities on regulations expected to have a signifi-
cant impact on them before the regulations are published for public comment), or included a
timetable for issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, suggesting that the agency has already
begun developing a regulatory response.
264 See supra Part II.C.
1434 [Vol. 79:1381
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1434 2010-2011
AGENCY DELAYS
the reasons discussed above in Part III.A. If agencies indicated mat-
ters that were low priorities or delayed due to resource constraints
and Congress was dissatisfied with the number of items stalled, Con-
gress could provide the agency with more resources, less responsibili-
ties, or better guidelines for prioritization.
For example, if OSHA had ten active rulemaking proceedings
and twenty other regulatory initiatives in the wings, it would be easy
to conclude that the agency did not have enough resources to get the
job done. Because a large group of activities would be similarly af-
fected, it would be easier for Congress to overcome collective action
impediments to address the problem. Beneficiaries awaiting different
regulatory actions similarly stalled would be able to band together and
point to the agency's admission that important matters are falling by
the wayside.
Agencies would be motivated to categorize their agendas in this
way if courts granted greater deference to the agency's timeline for
matters either at the priority-setting stage or deemed low priorities in
their OIRA submissions, placing the burden on plaintiffs to show that
the costs of delay are high and outweigh any potential benefits. 265 By
crediting the agencies' OIRA submissions, the courts would en-
courage greater transparency as well as more rational prioritization.
Moreover, the OIRA submissions would provide an important signal-
ing mechanism for Congress to consider whether legislative action is
warranted.
There is some danger that this would discourage agencies from
beginning substantive rulemaking or would create an incentive to cat-
egorize matters as low priorities. But it would be nearly impossible
for an agency to categorize a matter at the priority-setting stage if its
OIRA submissions indicate that it is crafting a substantive response.
Moreover, an affirmative declaration by an agency that a matter is a
low priority will be politically difficult to defend if the matter is in fact
important. And unless it is clear that a matter is important, it is not
such a bad thing if the agency defers focusing on it until other higher-
priority matters are completed.
C. A New Framework for Judicial Review of Agency Delays
Courts have an important role to play in curing agency delays.
But how should they go about it? This Section proposes that courts
utilize a form of cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") to ensure that agencies
265 See infra Part IV.C.
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do not thwart their legislative mandates and to encourage more ra-
tional priority setting.
1. The Reasons for Delay Must Be Grounded in the Statute
First, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Massachu-
setts v. EPA, courts must ensure that agencies ground their reasons for
delay in the enabling statute. 266 Thus, at a minimum, an agency must
justify its delay with respect to the enabling statute that requires the
discrete agency action. Neither bribes nor what may be sound policy
considerations, if statutorily irrelevant, are acceptable reasons for de-
lay.2 67 In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, where the agency had to
decide "whether [GhG] emissions contribute to climate change," de-
lay could only be justified by the need for additional time to make the
endangerment finding.268
The range of statutorily relevant issues will depend on the
breadth of the enabling statute and the decision that the agency must
make. Where Congress has articulated specific criteria for the agency
to consider, such as when screening applicants for public entitlements,
the universe of statutory reasons for deferring decisionmaking will be
quite narrow.269 The agency must justify its indecision by the need to
gather or review information necessary to determine the eligibility of
the applicant. By contrast, where Congress has charged the agency
with making less clearly defined judgments, not only about whether to
regulate but how, such as with broadly worded health, safety, and en-
vironmental legislation, there will likely be a wider range of statutory
reasons for prolonging decisionmaking. If, for example, the agency
must regulate water pollutants, the agency's delay might be justified
by investigating the risks associated with different concentrations of
pollutants based on the characteristics of the waterway or the affected
266 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007); cf Sunstein, supra note 20, at 677-78
(noting that many of the pre-Chaney inaction cases involved allegations that a statutorily irrele-
vant factor influenced the decision not to act). In most cases, the agency will cite the reason for
the delay in its defense, particularly if the agency believes that it is a legitimate justification for
deferring or prolonging the initiation or completion of decisionmaking. But if the agency does
not want to reveal or does not know the true cause of its delay, plaintiffs must uncover the cause
through discovery and present their evidence to the court. The plethora of executive privileges
typically claimed by government defendants can, unfortunately, create formidable obstacles for
plaintiffs seeking to identify improper influences of competing principals within the executive
branch. Courts should scrutinize such claims to ensure they are not used to hide illegitimate
causes of delay.
267 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533-34.
268 Id.
269 See supra note 35.
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populations. If the statute tempers its goal of clean water by requiring
only the best available or practicable technology, then such considera-
tions could also justify the agency's timeline.270
In either case, at a minimum, the agency must ground its reasons
for deferring or prolonging its decisionmaking in the consideration of
issues relevant to the decision that it is charged with making under the
statute. Courts regularly judge whether the factors agencies consider
in regulating are permissible or required under the enabling statute, so
they are also well prepared to judge whether the agency's reasons for
prolonging decisionmaking are grounded in the statute.
2. Delays Must Further Statutory Goals
Second, even if an agency is conscientiously gathering complex
data on the impact of GhGs on the environment or the health effects
of carcinogenic agents in the workplace, this cannot justify prolonging
its decisionmaking process forever. Although the quality of a decision
will often improve with more time (assuming the agency is working
diligently), the benefits of the improved decision may not be worth
the costs of the delay.271
Imagine a legislative act that seeks to deliver a public good val-
ued at x on an annual basis, say a safety standard for workers intended
to prevent x number of injuries per year. If the agency with rulemak-
ing authority implements the statute immediately, based on the availa-
ble information, it will promulgate a rule that prevents x - 5 injuries
(Decision A). In other words, in its haste, the agency underestimates
the safety standard required to achieve the intended benefit. Alterna-
tively, if the agency spends another year gathering additional informa-
tion, consulting different experts, and applying more personnel to the
matter, the agency's delayed decision will prevent x - 2 injuries (Deci-
sion B). Decision B is closer to the annual benefit that the statute
intended to provide. But from a principal-agent perspective, that does
not mean that Decision B does a better job implementing the enacting
coalition's goals than Decision A. If x = 100, then the cost in un-
prevented injuries of the one-year delay is 95. It will take thirty years
under Decision B for the intended beneficiaries to recoup the benefits
270 There would inevitably be cases in which it is not entirely clear whether the agencies'
reasons for delay are permitted by the statute, see generally, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What
Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. S-r. L. REv. 67, but such
questions, although important, are beyond the scope of this Article.
271 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 56, at 81 ("[Hlolding other factors constant, agen-
cies should postpone their decision just until the costs of further delay exceed the expected gain
in new information.").
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lost from the failure to implement Decision A in Year 1.272 Until that
time, Decision A does a better job achieving the enacting coalition's
legislative goals than Decision B. In the meantime, the agency may
amend the rule to account for new developments or the rule may be-
come obsolete, meaning that the benefits of Decision B are never
realized.
Of course, the prompt but poorer-quality decision might not
merely deliver fewer intended benefits but also impose unintended
costs that a more thoughtful decision would avoid. If the agency regu-
lates a chemical found in the workplace that upon further analysis
proves less harmful than initially believed, or the standard is stricter
than necessary to achieve the optimal level of risk, the quicker deci-
sion may burden the industry with costly and unnecessary regulation.
This does not change the fact, however, that delays producing better
quality decisions are not desirable if the cost of delay outweighs the
benefits. But the mitigation of the risk and consequences of over- or
under-regulating may be an important benefit of deferring or prolong-
ing decisionmaking.273
There are several practical challenges in the real world to such an
analysis. First, it is often difficult to determine the precise benefit that
the enacting coalition sought to deliver in broadly worded statutes
delegating specific policy decisions to the agency. 274 Nevertheless, de-
termining legislative goals for purposes of weighing the costs and ben-
efits of delay is no more difficult, and probably less so, than the
statutory interpretation in which courts routinely engage when re-
viewing agency action.
Consider the OSH Act, in which Congress declared its policy "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions." 27 5 The principal goal of the
enacting coalition was clearly to provide workers with the benefit of
greater safety. Although Congress presumably did not want to hobble
industries in the process, this concern merely limits the scope of the
primary goal of worker safety. Thus, the potential costs of delay in
regulating a risk under the OSH Act can be measured by the danger
272 This ignores discounting for future value if the injuries are monetized.
273 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 56, at 81 ("When stakes are high (as when a
nondecision might lead to significant irreversible negative consequences), the cost of delaying a
decision could be substantial.").
274 For helpful discussions of the promises and pitfalls of various approaches to statutory
interpretation, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 39, at 88-115, and SUNsTEIN, supra note 243,
at 111-226.
275 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
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posed to worker safety in the form of injuries, illnesses, and deaths. If
these are significant, then the cost of delay is quite high, unless no
regulation can satisfy the enacting coalition's desire that industry not
be overly burdened or the only feasible regulations will not signifi-
cantly mitigate the risk. These are the same types of issues that the
court must consider when reviewing whether agency action is consis-
tent with the enabling statute.
Of course, the enacting coalition may have passed the legislation
for purely symbolic reasons, and a majority may not actually want the
agency to engage in much regulation. 27 6 But unless the enacting coali-
tion has expressly revealed this desire in the statute, courts should not
facilitate such political pathologies, with all of the difficulties they
pose for agencies, by second-guessing the face of the statute.27 7
The legislative goals are even easier to ascertain with public bene-
fits. Put simply, such statutes have as their goal the delivery of speci-
fied benefits to intended beneficiaries. Thus, the cost of delay by
agencies such as the Social Security Administration or United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") in adjudicating ap-
plications for disability benefits or naturalization is measured by the
benefits lost while eligible beneficiaries wait for adjudication of their
applications. There is no secondary limiting principle, although obvi-
ously the procedures used should ensure that benefits are provided
only to eligible applicants.
Second, it is impossible to know with certainty in advance
whether the benefits of additional time are worth the costs. If the
agency does not yet know the magnitude of a risk posed by a chemical
in the workplace or the costs of imposing additional regulations on the
industry, the agency will have difficulty making this calculation. Simi-
larly, although agencies that screen large numbers of applications for
benefits, licenses, and the like can easily track the duration of each
stage of the process, they cannot know in advance whether additional
time spent on any single application will ultimately prove outcome
determinative.
Yet these are precisely the types of questions that agencies should
ask in setting their agendas and evaluating their decisionmaking
processes. Even in the face of uncertainty, agencies can estimate the
costs and benefits of deferring their decisions within ranges.278 If the
276 See Dwyer, supra note 67, at 234.
277 Id. at 285, 314-15.
278 See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(noting that agencies make predictions in the face of uncertainties).
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agency has no information regarding the cost of delay, we would not
expect the agency to prioritize the matter. But if the agency knows
that the costs of delay are likely to be significant, even if it does not
know precisely how significant, then the agency should proceed expe-
ditiously with determining an appropriate regulatory response. Simi-
larly, if an administrative procedure significantly prolongs an
adjudicatory process, the agency should assess whether the procedure
produces sufficient actionable, outcome-determinative information,
such that the benefits of the procedure are worth the costs of the
delays.
Third, as discussed in Part III.C.1, agencies will often delay ad-
dressing one matter so that they can work on another. The review-
ability of petitions for rulemaking means that citizens can put more
regulatory matters on an agency's agenda than it has resources to ad-
dress in a timely manner. 2 79 It is right for citizens to know the full
scope of their administrative state's responsibilities, but agencies with
finite resources still must prioritize their agendas.
Courts are not well equipped to understand a matter's relative
importance within the full panoply of an agency's agenda.280 Deci-
sions about whether to prioritize a matter requires multiple informal
judgments about whether (1) the matter can be addressed by regula-
tory action, (2) the regulatory tools available to the agency are likely
to be effective, (3) the information needed for decisionmaking is on
hand or obtainable, (4) the agency has the resources to get the job
done, and (5) such action is the best use of the agency's resources
relative to its other responsibilities. 281 These types of informal, and
often incremental, judgments share many characteristics with agency
enforcement decisions as described by the Court in Chaney.282 They
are within the peculiar expertise of the agency and difficult for courts
to review without manageable statutory guidelines or clear cases for
action.
Nevertheless, there is always a danger that competing principals,
such as the President, influential members of Congress, or a regulated
279 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007). Courts generally are comfortable mak-
ing these decisions because they simply require applying the substantive provisions of the rele-
vant statute to the facts presented in the petition for rulemaking. It does not involve addressing
the difficult question of how long it should take the agency to begin or complete a rulemaking
proceeding.
280 See supra Part III.C.1.
281 Cf Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (discussing factors relevant to resource-
allocation decisions).
282 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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industry, will seek to manipulate an agency's agenda to thwart a legis-
lative mandate. Put differently, the agency's low prioritization of a
matter may simply be a cover for an extra-legislative veto. Thus, there
must be a limit even to an agency's discretion over its priorities.
Accordingly, judicial review of agency delays must account for
both the inherent uncertainties in CBA and the need for agencies to
retain sufficient discretion over their agenda, while ensuring that
agencies do not thwart legislative mandates.
3. Balancing Agency Discretion with Meaningful Judicial Review
One way to balance these competing concerns would be for
courts to utilize shifting or sliding burdens of proof for agency delays
caused by prioritization versus substantive decisionmaking. The
OIRA reforms proposed above in Part IV.B would help courts classify
the type of delay at issue. When a party challenges an agency's deci-
sion to postpone or defer decisionmaking on a regulatory matter due
to its low priority, the burden would be on the challenging party to
show that the costs of delay are significant and clearly outweigh any
likely benefits of deferring decisionmaking. 283 If there is no evidence
to believe that delay is costly, the agency would retain control over its
agenda. But if the costs of deferring the matter are significant and
well known, the court should ask the agency to present credible coun-
tervailing benefits of postponing its decisionmaking. These might in-
clude the benefits of working on other regulatory matters, so long as
these other priorities are in pursuit of the same statutory goals. For
example, if an agency were charged with delay in regulating an air
pollutant under the CAA, the court would credit the agency's action
on other air pollutants under the Act, but not for activities focused on
distinct regulatory mandates. This would ensure that the agency is not
merely using its priorities to thwart important legislative goals.
If the agency were unable to produce credible countervailing ben-
efits of delay, the court would order the agency to set a timetable for
regulatory action. In addition, the court would retain jurisdiction with
the threat of contempt to ensure that the agency proceeds expedi-
tiously with decisionmaking.
Once an agency has begun formulating a regulatory response or
otherwise acknowledged that a problem is a regulatory priority, the
balance between these competing concerns shifts. To be sure, sub-
283 Courts should also require that plaintiffs first file a petition for rulemaking to give the
agency an opportunity to consider the claim of unreasonable delay before it is hauled into court.
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stantive decisions can also be quite complex and peculiarly within an
agency's expertise. Standard setting often involves a complex analysis
of interrelated factors with the potential to impact millions of individ-
uals and entire industries. The agency needs sufficient time to make a
reasoned judgment in light of the complexity of the decision and the
potential risks of getting it wrong. But because the agency has indi-
cated the importance of a matter, protests that competing priorities
prevent it from proceeding or that time is not of the essence are less
credible.
Moreover, as the agency proceeds with rulemaking and the likely
shape of regulation becomes clear, there is increasing danger that
competing principals will seek to derail agency action to protect their
interests. The agency itself may wish to avoid completing a matter as
the political costs of action loom large on the horizon. In addition,
prolonged decisionmaking raises efficiency concerns. As rulemaking
proceedings drag on institutional memory is lost and redundant work
must be performed. Meanwhile, the agency struggles to maintain for-
ward momentum on multiple fronts.
Accordingly, rulemaking proceedings not completed within two
years should be presumed unreasonably delayed. Two years is the
length of a congressional session. From a principal-agent perspective,
the agency's timeline for a delegated decision should not exceed the
enacting coalition's own event horizon, unless Congress has expressly
contemplated more prolonged decisionmaking in the statute itself.
The agency could rebut the presumption by presenting a reasoned ex-
planation of how additional time for decisionmaking would produce a
sufficiently better decision, such that the benefits would be worth the
costs exacted by the delay on the enacting coalition's legislative goals.
For example, even if the costs of delay are well known, the agency
may need more time to determine the right level of regulation if there
is a high risk that over- or under-regulating will have serious negative
consequences.
A two-year presumption would possess much of the action-forc-
ing attributes of a deadline, motivating agencies to focus on complet-
ing their priorities. But unlike a deadline, a rebuttable presumption
would allow agencies additional time for unusually complex decisions
or unforeseen circumstances. When the agency is working diligently
and additional time is worth the costs due to the risk and potential
consequences of error, it would be able to rebut the presumption.
Agencies actively engaged in rulemaking should have sufficient infor-
mation at their disposal to support their CBA.
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Agencies should be able to complete most important rulemaking
proceedings within two years.284 Moreover, if these matters are in-
deed priorities, we want agencies to complete them in two years.285
We do not set deadlines simply to provide ourselves with the time we
think we need to accomplish our goals; we set them to ensure that we
accomplish our goals in a timely manner.
Critics will complain that any presumption is arbitrary for the
range of complexity in the various rulemakings with which the admin-
istrative state is tasked. There is some merit to the charge. In an ideal
world, we would grant agencies precisely as much time as necessary
for each decision they must make. But developing a customized pre-
sumption for each decision an agency must make would essentially
require a totality-of-the-circumstances test, which has none of the ac-
tion-forcing attributes of a presumption and is not much different
from the present ad hoc judicial review of agency delay. Alterna-
tively, we could craft different presumptions for particular agencies or
statutes, but these would be just as vulnerable to a charge of arbitrari-
ness because there is still a great deal of variety in the decisions that
individual agencies must make, even under a single statute.
Moreover, unlike a per se rule or a hard statutory deadline, a
rebuttable presumption could be overcome if the agency demonstrates
that the decision is a particularly complex one or entails significant
risks of grave errors. Thus, any arbitrariness would be mitigated by
the rebuttable nature of the presumption.
There is some danger that agencies would respond to greater ju-
dicial deference for prioritization decisions or matters designated low
priorities in their OIRA submissions by elevating fewer matters to pri-
ority status. But agencies would continue to be responsive to compet-
ing principals and regulatory beneficiaries that desire agency action on
an array of matters. Indeed, it may even be desirable for judicial re-
view to provide agencies with leverage to resist largely symbolic re-
sponses to competing principals, thereby conserving their resources
for true legislative priorities. In any event, it would be difficult for
agencies to hide important regulatory matters among low priorities
given the transparency of their regulatory submissions to the OMB. If
284 Professors Gersen and O'Connell found that the average duration of significant
rulemaking proceedings between 1995 and 2008 was 503.4 days from the NPRM while the length
of routine rulemaking proceedings during the same period was 385.3 days. See Letter from Ja-
cob Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell to Jessica Hertz, supra note 229.
285 If the agency changes its mind about a priority, this decision should also be made delib-
erately and able to withstand scrutiny.
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the costs of delay were significant, plaintiffs would still be able to com-
pel agency action.
Finally, the proposed framework would provide agencies with
sufficient discretion to focus their resources on administration priori-
ties, while ensuring that a change of administrations does not bring
important regulatory matters to a halt because they offend an impor-
tant presidential constituency or simply are not White House priori-
ties. Of course, there is some danger that an outgoing presidential
administration might seek to take advantage of this burden-shifting
framework by elevating multiple regulatory matters to priority status
in an effort to control the incoming administration's agenda. But
courts should be able to see through such ruses and if little substantive
work has begun on a matter the incoming administration would have
no trouble removing its priority status.
4. Administrative Screening Programs
Administrative screening programs, such as the adjudication of
social security or immigration and naturalization benefits, are distinct
from rulemaking proceedings in important ways. Yet courts reviewing
delays in these programs should also consider the costs and benefits of
prolonged or deferred decisionmaking when caused by a principal-
agent problem.
Congress does not delegate screening programs because it is un-
certain as to the best policy to pursue, it is unwilling to make hard
policy choices, or it wishes to provide the agency with flexibility to
address new problems as they arise.28 6 Thus, the agency cannot point
to competing priorities for its attention because the enacting coali-
tion's mandate is clear that the administrative program is a nondiscre-
tionary priority.287
Furthermore, the scope of the delegated decision in screening
programs is usually quite narrow because Congress sets specific eligi-
bility criteria for most benefits.288 To be sure, the agency must make
decisions about each applicant's eligibility. On the simple end of the
286 See WILSON, supra note 44, at 236, 242-43, 246, 248-52 (explaining why Congress makes
the difficult political decisions in this context).
287 Moreover, individual procedural due process concerns are heightened with respect to
agency screening for benefits. Every circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that
applications for public benefits, where Congress has constrained the administrator's discretion
with specific eligibility criteria, trigger procedural due process protections. See Cushman v. Shin-
seki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
288 See supra note 35. Other nonentitlement screening programs, such as FCC licensing,
are likely to involve more complex decisionmaking because the agency must consider the impact
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spectrum, social security retirement benefits merely require the
agency to review an applicant's records to determine how long the
individual has worked and how much he or she has earned, calculate
the amount of the social security check based on the worker's age, and
mail and record the payment.289 On the more difficult end of the spec-
trum, social security disability claims require the agency to assess the
health and physical abilities of individual applicants.290 But each deci-
sion concerns only a single individual and most of the relevant infor-
mation will be contained within the applicant's submission, so the
agency will not have to gather information, analysis, and opinions
from diverse sources. In contrast to most standard setting, administra-
tive screening for benefits does not require the review of a plethora of
interrelated factors with the potential to impact diverse and unknown
parties. Accordingly, errors are also generally less consequential.
Therefore, in an ideal world the agency would review applications
as it receives them, determine the applicant's eligibility, and approve
or deny the application. In the case of social security retirement bene-
fits, almost any delay following eligibility for benefits would be intol-
erable because the decision is so simple. In the case of immigration or
social security disability benefits, where the decisions are slightly more
complicated, the time for decisionmaking may be a bit longer, but
should be measured by weeks or months and not years. 2 9 1
It is unlikely in the context of large screening programs that the
agency is attempting to thwart the primary goals of the enabling stat-
ute, but the agency's choice of procedures may not be the most effec-
tive means of pursuing those goals. For example, the Social Security
Act has the obvious aim of providing benefits to eligible beneficiaries,
but this includes the subsidiary goals of timely and accurate decisions.
The more procedures the agency utilizes to ensure the accuracy of its
decisions, the more difficult it will be for it to render a timely decision.
The challenge is to strike the right balance.
of its decision on a wider range of parties. Thus, they are more akin in certain ways to agency
standard setting.
289 See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006) (describing computation of primary insurance benefits); 20
C.F.R. § 404.902 (2011) (describing criteria for initial determinations in old age, survivors' and
disability insurance programs under Social Security Act); see also WiLsoN, supra note 44, at
99-100.
290 Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106-07 (1984) (discussing the complexities of the deci-
sion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (describing eligibility and determinations for disability benefits).
291 For example, in the case of naturalization applications, Congress has mandated that the
agency adjudicate applications within 120 days of interviewing the applicant and expressed its
sense that "the processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later
than 180 days after the initial filing." 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2006).
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In addition, the agency may institute procedures not simply to
render more accurate decisions in pursuit of its primary goal, but to
further a distinct goal or to protect itself from political fallout from its
decisions. For example, following the September 11 terrorist attacks,
USCIS (the successor to Immigration and Naturalization Services) en-
acted cumbersome new background checks of applicants for lawful
permanent residency and naturalization. 292 It is questionable whether
much of the information reviewed by USCIS, which went well beyond
traditional criminal background checks, was in fact relevant to the eli-
gibility determinations that the agency was charged with making
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act.29 3 Many applicants
caught up in background checks that dragged on for years were
merely witnesses to crimes and posed no known threat to U.S. secur-
ity.294 But the procedures represented a new agency priority-pro-
tecting America's border-in the post-9/11 political landscape.
Where delays are caused by procedural bottlenecks, the court
should ask the agency to explain how the procedures allow the agency
to make better decisions, such that the costs to the program are worth
the benefits. For example, if the agency's review of certain sources
yields little actionable information not available from other sources,
but slows down the screening program for large numbers of appli-
cants, the benefits are likely not worth the costs. If the court deter-
mines that the costs of the procedures to the enacting coalition's goals
are not worth the benefits, than the agency should be compelled to act
more quickly. In exchange, the court would have to rule that the pro-
cedure causing the bottleneck is not required under the enabling stat-
ute. Even if the court does not ultimately compel action, asking
agencies to justify their procedures would enhance the transparency of
agency decisionmaking and encourage more rational administration of
the programs delegated by Congress.
However, delays in large screening programs are not always the
result of procedural bottlenecks. They may also be the result of hav-
ing too many applications to process with too few adjudicators. Thus,
delays are the result, in part or in whole, of the failure of Congress to
allocate sufficient funding to the agency to get the job done. In these
292 Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2009).
293 See 2007 CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 40-41, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMBAnnual%2OReport_2007.pdf. The Ombudsman
agreed with "the assessment of many case workers and supervisors at USCIS field offices and
service centers that the FBI name check process has limited value to public safety or national
security" and questioned its use. Id.
294 Id.
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cases the delay is better understood as the result of a dysfunctional
principal than a problem in the principal-agent relationship between
Congress and the agency. Consequently, there is little that the court
can do to compel agency action. You cannot squeeze water from a
stone.
Still, even in such cases courts can play an important signaling
function by declaring the agency's decisionmaking unreasonably
delayed due to resource constraints. Agency beneficiaries would then
be able to leverage the court's judgment to lobby Congress for addi-
tional funding. At a minimum, the court's judgment would make
Congress's use of appropriations to gut administrative programs-
which may constitute a stealth repeal-more transparent.
5. The Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBA itself can be costly and time-consuming.295 But weighing the
costs and benefits of delay to enacting coalition's goals would be less
involved than the detailed CBA in which agencies must engage for
proposed regulations. Moreover, because agencies now engage in ex-
tensive CBA for proposed regulations, beginning CBA when setting
priorities would be a wise investment of time and resources that would
pay off down the road. Even if CBA causes an agency not to regulate,
it is hard to believe that the cost of CBA would be greater than the
cost of unnecessary regulations. In any event, although analyzing the
costs and benefits of delay may involve some additional work on the
part of the agency, it is the price of rational priority setting.296
Although the inherent uncertainty in CBA of delay means that
the agency's timeline for decisionmaking would often be contestable,
such analysis, for all of its flaws, is preferable to other less transparent
or less accountable means of deciding when to act, such as pleasing an
influential member of Congress, reacting to external events, or simply
"muddling through." 297 From a principal-agent perspective, agencies
should set their priorities and timeline for action to best achieve Con-
gress's legislative objectives.
295 Cf. SHANE, supra note 195, at 168 (calculating the costs of the OMB's regulatory
review).
296 See generally REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 29 (arguing that the use of CBA leads
to more rational decisionmaking and better policy outcomes).
297 See Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 261-64.
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CONCLUSION
There is no magic bullet to cure agency delays. Given the ever-
increasing number of agency responsibilities and the pressure to slash
budget deficits, unless political will emerges to raise tax revenue, we
can expect the administrative state to have more responsibilities on its
plate for the foreseeable future than it can handle expeditiously. We
need a doctrine of judicial review that encourages rational priority set-
ting by agencies consistent with their legislative mandates, identifies
causes of delay that undermine accountability, facilitates legislative re-
sponses to cure systemic problems, and allows courts to address delays
that are difficult for Congress to cure. It is a tall order, but reconceiv-
ing agency delays as a principal-agent problem could be a first step to
achieving these goals.
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